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ABSTRACT 
INCONSPICUOUS BUT INDESPENSIBLE: 
CHARLES ANDERSON DANA AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR 
by Aaron Edward Foster 
August 2013 
Charles Anderson Dana' s contributions to Union victory during the American 
Civil War extend far beyond his well-known relationship with General Ulysses S. Grant. 
Using both his journalistic talents and patriotism, he gained Secretary of War Edwin M. 
Stanton's trust, which was essential for Dana to perform his duties effectively at the War 
Department in Washington City from 1864 to 1865. His obligations encompassed a 
broad spectrum of responsibilities from investigating dishonest contractors and federal 
officials attempting to defraud the government to authorizing the arbitrary arrests of 
civilians. He simultaneously performed lesser-known activities such as arranging 
soldiers' furloughs for the 1864 presidential election, functioning as a point of contact for 
prison facilities, overseeing massive troop movements, procuring supplies, military 
recruitment, and additional miscellaneous issues that constantly flooded the department 
during his tenure. Examining Dana's involvement with these obscure, yet vital matters 
not only reveals the extent of the War Department's authority but also accentuates Dana's 
key contributions to the Union war effort. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In late October 1864, a political scandal erupted. Abraham Lincoln was worried 
about the upcoming election and high-ranking members of his administration were busy 
trying to win the President a second term. The War Department had been working for 
months to secure the soldier vote through furloughs and absentee ballots. Reports that 
New York agents, under Governor Horatio Seymour's guidance, were plotting to steal the 
election for Democratic candidates using the state's absentee ballots only increased the 
administration's anxiety. With the arrest of these agents and other suspects, key 
members of Lincoln's cabinet endeavored to exploit the situation. While it is impossible 
to determine if this incident actually affected the election's outcome, the trials of several 
defendants stretched into November and December. Lincoln even personally interviewed 
one of the prisoners with a seemingly unimportant man sitting quietly in the background 
witnessing the confession. Unbeknownst to the accused, this person was Assistant 
Secretary of War Charles Anderson Dana, who managed a variety of War Department 
affairs, including investigating threats to the Union war effort. 1 
Like the accused, few realize, then or today, the extent of Dana's significance to 
Lincoln's administration and Union victory. While much of the Lincoln scholarship 
focuses on the President or key members of his cabinet, historical narratives have largely 
neglected those serving in important, albeit subordinate positions, such as Charles Dana. 
For this reason, there has been little research concerning his work at the War Department. 
However, his public service in Washington City involved a wide range of issues for the 
1 Joseph George Jr., "The North Affair: A Lincoln Administration Trial, 1864," Civil War History 
33, no. 3 (September 1987): 203 , 207, 2 12. 
2 
department based on the extent to which Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton delegated 
authority to his senior subordinates, and the individuals he trusted as Assistant Secretaries 
of War. 
Dana's existing biographical studies focus on two major areas of his life. The 
most popular was his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant. The first and most 
comprehensive biography, The Life ofCharles A. Dana by James Harrison Wilson, 
represents this trend. While providing a detailed account of Dana's life, this 1907 sketch 
concentrates on his activities with the Union army and his relationship with Grant during 
and after the war. However, one must be skeptical of any analysis and judgment present 
in Wilson's work, as his close friendship with Dana taints many of its accounts. 
Additionally, this biography provides only vague references to Dana's actual duties while 
in Washington City, placing them mostly within a self-serving context or the framework 
of the broader military actions of the Union. For example, The Life of Charles A. Dana is 
filled with claims that Dana "was generally recognized as a more virile and vigorous 
writer than his chief, and a more consistent and patriotic one than most of his rivals."2 
Harry J. Maihafer takes a similar approach in The General and the Journalists. In 
his preface, he summarizes Dana' s significance to the war by declaring, "Dana, as a War 
Department observer sent to report on Grant, was a major player in the general's rise to 
military prominence."3 Dana's Recollections of the Civil War, which Ida Tarbell actually 
wrote, adheres to this trend, focusing on explaining his interactions with the Union army, 
2 James Harrison Wilson, The Life of Charles Anderson Dana (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1907), 177. 
3 Harry J. Maihafer, The General and the Journalists: Ulysses S. Grant, Horace Greeley, and 
Charles Dana (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998), xiv. 
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while devoting only two chapters to topics on his activities while in Washington City.4 
Charles Vincent Spaniolo's 1965 dissertation, likewise, concentrates on different aspects 
of Dana' s time in the field as well as the significance President Lincoln and Secretary 
Stanton attributed to Dana's opinions ofUnion generals.5 
Janet E. Steele' s The Sun Shines for All represents the second historiographical 
trend: his life as a journalist. Although she includes Dana' s activities during the Civil 
War in a twelve-page chapter entitled "Interlude: The Civil War," she highlights his 
accomplishments and politics as a journalist and editor of some of the most popular and 
influential newspapers in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century: the New York 
Tribune and the New York Sun. While acknowledging that historians have ignored Dana, 
Steele attempts to disclose the attributes that made him a successful and popular 
newspaper editor, as well as, how he managed to transform the New York Sun from an 
inconsequential paper to one of the most prominent dailies in the United States.6 
As Dana' s superior, Edwin McMasters Stanton is a very important and influential 
player in this study. Perhaps only the dearth of works on this Secretary of War surpasses 
the absence of historical inquiries on Dana. Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's 
Secretary of War by Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, first published in 1962, 
4 Charles Anderson Dana, Recollections of the Civil War: With Leaders at Washington in the Field 
in the Sixties (New York: D. Appleton, 1898), 156-167, 235-247. Both chapters in this autobiography 
explain certain legal issues offering more of Dana's opinions ofkey members in Lincoln' s Cabinet rather 
than of Dana's actual duties. 
5 Charles Vincent Spaniolo, "Charles Anderson Dana: His Early Life and Civil War Career" 
(Ph.D. diss .. Michigan State University, 1965), 2-4. Spaniolo had five disparate conclusions. First, Dana 
exhibited great humanitarian sympathies during his youth that were increasingly absent as he aged. 
Second, he was highly influential when he worked for the New York Tribune. Third, the Cairo Claims 
Commission "overlooked evidence of fraudulent transactions by the Quartermaster at Cairo, Illinois." 
Fourth, his evaluations of Union military commanders influenced Lincoln's and Stanton 's opinions, and 
finally his evaluations of" military events and leaders was controversial." 
6 Janet E. Steele, The Sun Shines for All: Journalism and Ideology in the Life of Charles A. Dana 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), xi-xiv. 
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is arguably the most comprehensive and balanced of his biographies. 7 Still, there are 
instances where the authors mask or diminish rather unflattering aspects of Stanton's 
personality.8 Their examination of his reforms at the War Department, however, is well 
done. For this reason, their work provides one of the foundations for the analysis of the 
Secretary of War in this study. 
Concerning changes in the War Department, an important component of Dana's 
duties included the much-neglected Quartermaster Corps. Overseeing all matters relating 
to the Union army's logistics, this branch was responsible for obtaining and supplying 
equipage and transportation. Ema Risch's Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History 
of the Corps, 1775-1939 is a comprehensive examination ofthis bureau. Concentrating 
on the Quartermaster Corps' continual evolution from its inception to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, her work is the only study on this topic that includes Dana as a 
7 While this is the most recent Stanton biography, there are instances in which Frank Abial 
Flower's Edwin McMasters Stanton: The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation, and Reconstruction (New 
York: Saalfield Publishing, 1905) provides a better analysis for the purpose of this examination. For 
example, instead of viewing Dana as a close friend and confident of the Secretary of War, Flower handles 
him more as an Assistant Secretary of War, even devoting a chapter to Stanton's most important 
lieutenants, in which Dana and two other Assistant Secretaries of War appear. For these reasons, th is study 
uses the two biographies simultaneously, incorporating aspects from a third when necessary, to create an 
accurate picture of Stanton as a Secretary of War and his actions to reorganize the War Department. 
However, a common problem with both biographies is the citations. While Flower provides very few 
citations, making the verification of his claims exceedingly arduous, it is difficult to determine to which 
passages Thomas and Hyman's citations belong. For a brief overview of the historiography surrounding 
Stanton's biographies and his place in American memory see Thomas and Hyman's epilogue. 
8 Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary 
of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 179, xiv-xv. One such instance addresses Stanton's composure 
during the battle between the Monitor and the Merrimack, in which Thomas and Hyman merely portray 
Stanton as "the most excited of them all," but "soon calmed down." However, they explicitly state in their 
introduction that whi le Stanton' s biographers have championed his accomplishments, he continues to 
remain an unpopular figure in American history. With the release of new collections, they attempt to create 
a "fairer evaluation of Stanton's life." In the end, they have made a fruitfu l effort towards such a study, 
even ifthis biography mitigates facets of Stanton's faults. However, this trend may also be an attempt to 
curb the negative national opinion of Stanton that two recent works created by attempting to implicate the 
Secretary of War in the assassination plot of President Lincoln. See DavidS. Sparks, review of Stanton: 
The Life and Times of Lincoln 's Secretary of War, by Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 87, no. I (January 1963): 119. However, T . Harry 
Williams's review claims that this is the most authoritative biography written on Stanton, see T. Harry 
Williams review of Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln 's Secretary of War, by Benjamin P. Thomas 
and Harold M. Hyman, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49, no. I (June 1962): 150. 
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participant in the department's operation. For Risch's purpose, the Civil War represented 
a period of massive change, necessitating that the Quartermaster Department, along with 
the War Department, expand and adapt to the military's growing demands to create "an 
effective depot system."9 
Another important area of research on the Lincoln administration relates to 
matters of a legal nature. 10 One of the most recent authorities on this topic is Mark E. 
Neely Jr.'s The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. Analyzing the 
effect that Lincoln' s policies had on citizens' civil liberties, Neely deviates from other 
debates that focus on the constitutionality of Lincoln's actions during the Civil War. 11 
His work is also one of the few in which Dana is credited with an active role in the War 
9 Erna Risch, Quartermaster Supply of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939 (Washington, 
DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1989), 452. For more information on the 
Quartermaster's Department consult John Elwood Clark's Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of 
Management on Victory and Defeat (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 200 I), Sherrod E. East's 
"Montgomery C. Meigs and the Quartermaster Department," Military Affairs 25. no. 4 (Winter 1961-1962): 
183-196, and Russell F. Weigley's Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M. C. Meigs 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). While Clark 's work represents the most recent scholarship 
on the Quartermaster Corps, he does not address Dana in an authoritative role. Instead, Clark treats Dana 
merely as an observer for the War Department during the logistical difficulties surrounding the Battle of 
Chickamauga. East' s article fails to mention Dana and relies heavily on Risch and Weigley's work, which 
remains the first and only biography to examine the head of the Quartermaster Corps during the Civil War. 
Weigley focuses almost solely on Meigs and his subordinates, making only vague references to the 
administrators in the War Department. Even Stanton is not a major individual in this biography. 
As the bulk of this study of Dana's involvement with the Quartermaster Corps concerns the Union 
transportation system, there are several works that provide insight to this issue including Thomas Weber's 
The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-1865 (New York: King's Crown, 1952), George Edgar 
Turner's Victory Rode the Rails.' The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War (New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), and William G. Thomas's The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making 
of Modern America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
10 The debate concerning the constitutionality of Lincoln's actions and their repercussions is one to 
which both legal scholars and historians contribute. However, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
subsequent legislation, and executive action taken under President George H. W. Bush, there have been a 
number of studies that have used the Lincoln administration as a lens to view President Bush's actions. 
Such studies include: Daniel Farber's Lincoln 's Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 
and Benjamin A. Kleinerman's "Lincoln's Example: Executive Power and the Survival of 
Constitutionalism," Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 4 (December 2005): 801-816. Even though these 
examinations provide an interesting comparison, as this study does not seek to compare the 
constitutionality of President Lincoln's actions with those of another president, it does not cite these 
analyses. 
11 Mark E. Neely Jr., The Fate of Liberty- A braham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991 ), xi. 
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Department's investigations. 12 For issues concerning the legality of Lincoln's actions, J. 
G. Randall's Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln remains the authoritative work; 
however, he makes no mention of Dana' s participation in arbitrary arrests, handling war 
prisoners, and other matters that involved the War Department. 13 Although this study 
does not debate the constitutionality of Lincoln 's actions, it does acknowledge that Dana 
was an active participant in some of the president's questionable activities. The 
approaches these two works use complement each other in their analysis of Dana' s legal 
responsibilities. 14 
For this study, the key component of Dana' s judicial activities is War Department 
investigations. 15 Most of the works devoted to this topic focus on specific investigators 
12 Neely only includes Dana in a section that addresses investigations into fraudulent contractors 
and does not implicate him in any discussion on issues concerning voter fraud nor does Neely emphasize 
Dana's role in the Lincoln administration 's arbitrary arrests. Other works nominally place Dana in this role, 
such as J. Matthew Gallman' s Mastering Wartime: A Social Hrstory of Philadelphia During the Civil War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 289. Dana is such an obscure figure in this work 
that he is not even in the index. 
13 Michael Les Benedict, " A Constitutional Crisis," in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to 
Understand, ed. James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1998), 163; J. G. Randall , Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana: The University of 
Illinois Press, 1951 ). John A Marshall' s American Bastille: A History of the Illegal Arrests and 
Imprisonment of American Citizens in the Northern and Border States, On Account of Their Political 
Opinions, During the Late Civil War (Philadelphia: Thomas W. Hartley, 1881 ) is the previous work that 
addressed this same issue, although it is a highly biased account of the various actions and activities of the 
Lincoln administration. Additionally, while it provides a greater degree of detail for the included examples, 
it only makes vague references to Dana. However, it does include descriptions of some of Dana' s 
lieutenants, such as Lafayette C. Baker. Other works that address legal aspects of Lincoln Administration 
concerning Dana' s activities include: Robert Bruce Murray's Legal Cases of the Civil War 
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003) that included cases brought before the Supreme Court 
debating the constitutionality of Lincoln administration' s actions and Mark E. Neely' s Lincoln and the 
Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill , The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2011), which is a comparative examination between the United States and the 
Con federate Constitutions. 
14 Another important aspect of this study is employing some of the analyses concerning Lincoln' s 
stance towards the Border States to place Dana's actions and directives in the appropriate context. The most 
recent of these works include William C. Harris' s Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas, 20 II ). Also see William E. Gienapp's "Abraham Lincoln and the Border 
States," Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 13 ( 1922): 13-46. 
15 For analysis of the Provost Marshals during the American Civil War consult: Wilton P. Moore's 
" Union Army Provost Marshals in the Eastern Theater," Military Affairs 24, no. 3 (Autumn 1962): 120-126 
and "The Provost Marshal Goes to War," Civil War History 5, no. I (March 1959): 62-71. 
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or the origins of the modem United States Secret Service, which was then under the 
direction of the War Department. 16 Its most famous investigator, Lafayette C. Baker, 
published personal memoirs of his time in the department shortly after the war. 17 
However, most of these historical examinations either ignore Dana or place him in a 
tertiary role. 18 Works, such as William James Flavin's master' s thesis, argues, "Baker 
operated freely, often disregarding the orders of lesser officials like Charles Dana." 19 
Such beliefs represent the pervasive sentiment in works on this topic and are ones that 
this study seeks to debunk, as Dana' s management of War Department inquiries is clearer 
when placed in the context of actual investigations and his other responsibilities. 
16 Nonnan Ansley' s "The United States Secret Service: An Administrative History," Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Political Science 47, no. I (May-June 1956): 93-109 represents a trend 
that focuses on the origins of the United States Secret Service and provides the best explanation of the 
terminology applied during the Civil War to describe the War Department's investigative bureau. 
Additionally, this article gives a great overview of how this organization changed with the establishment of 
the current United States Secret Service under the Treasury Department. 
17 Baker is the most examined and understood Provost Marshal General during Dana's tenure, 
primari ly as the result of his extensive account of his involvement. However, another personality who 
greatly infl uenced the War Department's handling of investigations was Allan Pinkerton, who had already 
left the War Department prior to Dana's arrival in Washington City. For more on Pinkerton consult Jay 
Bonansinga' s Pinkerton 's War: The Civil War 's Greatest Spy and the Birth of the U.S. Secret Service 
(Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 20 12) and Allan Pinkerton ' s The Spy of the Rebellion: Being a True History of 
the Spy System of the United States Army during the Late Rebellion. Revealing Many Secrets of the War 
Hitherto Not Made Public (New York: Dillingham Publishers, 1888). These two individuals, however, 
represent exceptions to the scholarship concerning the Provost Marshals in the Civil War. 
18 L. C. Baker, History of the United States Secret Service (Philadelphia: L. C. Baker, 1867). 
While Baker briefly served under the distinction of the Chief of the Detective Service, he also worked 
under Dana as a Provost Marshal General. Baker has stimulated much interest in the historical community, 
and, for this reason, he is the subject of many biographies. The fact that Baker has a dismissive attitude 
towards Dana has been a major contributor to his corresponding posture in Baker's subsequent biographies. 
These works include William James Flavin ' s "Lafayette C. Baker and the Union Secret Service," (master's 
thesis, Emory University, 1973), 264, Jacob Mogelever' s Death to Traitors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1960), and Arthur Orrmont's Mr. Lincoln's Master Spy: Lafayelle C. Baker (New York: Julian Messner, 
1966). For an examination of other aspects of Baker' s involvement in the Civil War consult Joseph George 
Jr.'s '" Black Flag Warfare': Lincoln and the Raids Against Richmond and Jefferson Davis," Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography 115, no. 3 (July 1991 ): 291-318. 
19 Flavin, "Lafayette C. Baker and the Union Secret Service," 23 1. Both Mogelever's and Flavin ' s 
work are dismissive of Dana' s involvement in the War Department's investigations, which is consistent 
with the portrayal that Baker offers in his memoirs. However, Flavin' s thesis reveals a more thorough 
understanding of Dana's role in the War Department and incorporates a comparison between Dana's 
operations in overseeing these investigations and his predecessor: Assistant Secretary of War Peter Watson. 
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Even with the quantity of scholarly studies concerning the Civil War, many 
historical questions remain unanswered. Some of these queries include: What was 
Dana's role in managing the military affairs of a national citizen army that dwarfed any 
previous one the United States produced? How did Dana operate within the new 
bureaucracy Stanton created? What role did subordinate staff members, such as Dana, 
perform in Stanton's organization? What were some of the issues delegated to Assistant 
Secretaries of War? With all of Stanton's responsibilities, what were his priorities and 
were Dana's actions congruous? Focusing on an official key to them all, Charles Dana, 
this thesis addresses these questions. 
Dana's tenure at the War Department offers a unique perspective of the issues it 
handled during the war. In 1860, the department was relatively small. Immediately upon 
replacing the inept Simon Cameron as Secretary of War in January 1862, Stanton greatly 
expanded and reformed its operations.20 To do this, he instituted priorities, expectations, 
and overarching policies to dictate how his revamped department would function with the 
increased responsibilities and issues that accompanied the mobilization of the nation's 
population, infrastructure, and manufacturing to maximize the Union' s effort to defeat 
the Confederacy. 
The most prevalent changes occurred in the early phases of the war. When 
Dana's tenure began during the summer of 1864, Stanton had already firmly established 
the structural apparatus for managing the war. Therefore, a level of continuity for the 
individuals, agencies, and other federal departments from which Dana received his orders 
and guidance as well as those providing consultation and direction, already existed. 
20 Doris Keams Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: 
Simon & Schulster, 2006), 414. 
9 
Instead of examining the War Department's evolution under Stanton's leadership, this 
study explores the department's daily operations from the perspective of one of his most 
trusted assistants. While Stanton had several Assistant Secretaries, he retained Dana for 
the duration of the war and entrusted him with great responsibility, including serving as 
the acting Secretary of War. 
While the War Department's structure remained relatively constant during Dana's 
tenure as Assistant Secretary of War, it was not a static department. The problems, 
conspiracies, and fraudulent abuses of the government's trust and funds changed 
continuously, resulting in little consistency in the daily business Dana conducted. Many 
of the issues he oversaw at the end of the war had been continuous challenges for the War 
Department, such as raising volunteer regiments. With the first federal draft, however, 
Dana dealt with problems, albeit sometimes peculiar, resulting from this new policy. 
He also handled queries concerning a wide range of governmental policies 
extending beyond the normal purview of the traditional notions of the functions of the 
War Department. These included, but were not restricted to, soldiers' furloughs, 
prisoners, recruiting and transporting personnel, and purchasing provisions, while at the 
same time humoring businessmen who sought to ensure that an adequate number of 
turkeys would be available for Union soldiers to celebrate Thanksgiving in 1864. The 
fact that Dana dealt with a gamut of concerns blurs any notion of a clear division of labor 
in the Lincoln administration?1 Therefore, Dana's experiences offer a great case study 
into the operation of the War Department. 
2 1 The tendency to compartmentalize the duties of specific government bureaus is pervasive in 
Civi l War biographies, in which the authors illustrate the significance of their subjects and in doing so draw 
artificial boundaries between the responsibilities delegated to each department. In contrast, this study will 
attempt to blur these divisions and show how the duties of these departments overlapped. 
10 
Prior to establishing himself in Washington in 1864, Dana served in a variety of 
capacities in multiple theatres. These experiences augmented his administrative abilities 
as well as his perception of the Assistant Secretary of War's responsibilities. Under the 
guise of investigating fraudulent and illegal activities, Stanton had Dana report on the 
abilities of Ulysses S. Grant to give the Lincoln Administration a better understanding of 
his suitability to assume overall command ofthe Union army. While in the field with the 
Army of the Tennessee and the Army ofthe Cumberland, he frequently conversed with 
the Union commanders. In this way, Dana gained a heightened understanding of military 
matters, which he continually used to pass judgment on numerous Union commanders, 
regardless of whether or not Stanton requested. it. Witnessing military operations, 
whether at the siege of Vicksburg or the battle at Chickamauga, gave his dispatches a 
superior and solid insight and understanding of the tactics, operations, and strategies of 
the army, especially for a journalist who had never served in any military capacity. 
While it is impossible to determine how these experiences shaped and transformed his 
attitudes as Assistant Secretary of War, Dana's communications reveal a perspicacity that 
encompasses these previous duties. 
An important component of this examination is not only revealing aspects of how 
the War Department operated during the Civil War, but also Dana' s significance in its 
activities. The functions and work of lesser, but still senior, civilian officials are essential 
to comprehend the Civil War and how the Lincoln Administration was able to perform as 
an efficient bureaucracy to secure Union victory. The extent ofthe issues Dana dealt 
with illustrates the War Department's broad scope of authority. Additionally, the 
flexibility, dedication, and mental fortitude that Dana demonstrated exposes the type of 
individual Stanton appreciated and sought to employ within his new bureaucratic 
structure. 
To accomplish these objectives, this work consists of several chapters. The 
second provides pertinent background information, including a cursory examination of 
Dana's life prior to becoming the Assistant Secretary of War. In particular, it focuses 
briefly on his life working for Horace Greeley at the New York Tribune, how Dana 
became acquainted with Stanton, Dana's first assignments investigating cases of 
defrauding the United States government, and his duties at the front. In addition, it 
addresses Stanton's personality, priorities, and mindset when he became Secretary of 
War to create the department in which Dana would work when he came to Washington 
City in 1864. It also contains an examination of one of Stanton's previous Assistant 
Secretaries of War in order to compare him to Dana. The purpose of this chapter is 
threefold. First, it shows how Dana gained Stanton' s trust, which was essential for 
Dana's duties at the department. Second, it discusses how Stanton's unique personality 
affected Dana. Finally, it reveals the bureaucratic structure he would manage. 
The third chapter begins with a study of Dana's management and oversight of 
War Department inquiries. Comprehensive case files supply much of the information 
regarding the breadth of these probes, his relationship with his subordinates, and his 
culpability concerning his actions in some of the Lincoln administration's legal 
controversies. Addressing the range of issues Dana' s agents investigated, this chapter 
demonstrates that, while an active participant in the arbitrary arrests of civilians, Dana 
did not abuse his authority. 
ll 
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The fourth chapter expands beyond the scope of legal issues to include various 
duties he performed at the War Department. Since its bureaucratic structure was already 
established, the emphasis is to explain Dana's function as Assistant Secretary of War 
rather than how his management style evolved over time. Based on an examination of his 
correspondence, this chapter explores Dana's role in securing the soldier vote, handling 
the wartime prisoner population, overseeing troop movements, procurement, and legal 
issues such as emancipation. The broad range of these requests reveals not only 
important information concerning the qualities that Stanton saw in his trusted subordinate 
but identifies the matters he delegated to Dana. Additionally, as this chapter includes 
such a wide diversity of topics, the historiography for many of the specific issues is 
located in the footnotes. 
Throughout these chapters, this study employs a much simpler, but similar 
methodology to that of James M. McPherson in For Cause and Comrades?2 Information 
accumulated from approximately one thousand six hundred pieces of correspondence, 
addressed directly to Dana or ones that he composed provide the basis for the evidence 
and conclusions in the second and third chapters of this work. Unlike the soldiers' letters 
that McPherson uses that could be examined individually to reveal combat motivations, 
anxieties, or religious beliefs, most of Dana's communications require piecing together 
dispatches to create a conversation. At times this is relatively simple, as Dana, based on 
the telegram's timestamp, was most likely in the telegraph office and merely scribbled his 
22 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), vii-xi. Whereas McPherson's work relies on a representative sample 
of letters and diaries of 1,076 soldiers from the North and South, t~is study utilizes all available 
correspondence to and from Dana to create the most comprehensive analysis of his time as Assistant 
Secretary of War in Washington City. 
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response underneath the original message, thus creating a direct link similar to the reply 
function employed with today's email. 
However, this is a rarity. Most of the communications used to support this 
study's conclusions require coordinating numerous dispatches. For example, the 
telegrams sent and received by the War Department are in two separate categories of 
microfilm, requiring the verification of each message's subject matter, time, and pertinent 
individuals and then pairing them with each other. The most impressive collection, and 
those most commonly cited in this study, are in the bound volumes that the War 
Department sent and received.23 While some of these appear in the War of the Rebellion: 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, most do not. There is also an 
unbound series of messages with valuable information. Many telegrams, however, are 
missing and therefore preclude the creation of a coherent conversation. In fact, in many 
instances, the related telegrams could not be located in any of the examined microfilmed 
series. Rather, ifthey still exist, they may be located in an undisclosed collection at the 
National Archives in Washington, DC or tucked away in various other places. 
Therefore, this project relies primarily on information from the National Archives 
collections in which there was a reasonable expectation, albeit sometimes very remote, 
for correspondence related to Dana's tenure. Many of the telegrams no longer exist, 
having been either misplaced, thrown away, or subject to some other fate. It has been 
difficult to find many of Dana's letters in response to those submitted to the War 
23 The collection mentioned above consists of Microfilm Series 473. The volumes entitled 
Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April27, 1861-July 30, 1881 and Telegrams Received by the 
Secretary of War, April15, 1861-March 31, 1869 are parts ofthis series and represent where the bulk of 
the material for this project originated. Aspects of this series also include other volumes of telegrams that 
did not contain much correspondence involving Dana. Volumes entitled Telegrams Sent by the Provost 
Marshal General's Office, March 23, 1863-November 2, 1870 and Telegrams Received by the Provost 
Marshal General's Office, April2, 1863-April, 6, 1874 are examples ofthis. 
Department, as it did not make copies. It appears that Dana preferred to use the postal 
service to send and receive a large amount of his lengthy correspondence, such as 
affidavits containing relevant information on various aspects of his functions and 
responsibilities. However, the time it took for the mail to travel, in addition to the 
comparably limited quantity of letters, means that this source appears less often in this 
work. 
14 
Some of the missing communication, nevertheless, is no doubt intentional. There 
are several instances of individuals inquiring if the War Department received original 
telegrams or letters. During a major crisis, Dana likely devoted neither the time nor the 
energy to grant or deny many minor requests that constantly flooded the War 
Department, such as furloughs for a single soldier. In many cases, he probably forgot 
about them. In other instances, he may simply have not wanted to respond to a specific 
Issue. The reasons for this remain a mystery. 
Aspects of this approach, however, cater to several possible pitfalls, which this 
study has taken great steps to avoid. Since little secondary literature exists on which to 
base this analysis, there is a natural propensity to form conclusions based on the evidence 
contained in only a few telegrams. The fact that Dana's correspondence involves a wide 
variety of topics with little overlap exacerbates this tendency. To prevent this, the 
examples included attempt to illustrate larger trends in Dana's responsibilities as 
Assistant Secretary of War. However, at times, oddities in the War Department's 
dispatches reveal as much, if not more, about Dana's dealings and his placement in 
Stanton' s bureaucratic structure as those focusing on matters that are more ordinary. 
15 
While this study relies heavily on a primary source analysis, there are areas that 
rely on secondary literature. The nature of the material covered in the first chapter is the 
greatest example ofthis, as the application of various analyses and studies on a range of 
topics introduce Dana's functions in the War Department and the various issues and 
personalities that he dealt with while in Washington City. Additionally, this also occurs 
throughout the second and third chapters where it is necessary to provide a certain level 
of context surrounding the circumstances and individuals addressed in Dana' s 
correspondence. When this arises, the accompanying footnote lists the authoritative 
works directly in the text or cites them first, followed by additional sources addressing 
similar problems, with any inconsistency between them presented in the footnote . 
Newspaper articles that attest to certain events also help provide some of the needed 
information and further the explanations ofthe activities Dana managed, especially 
concerning the events his operatives investigated. 
Even though Dana's penmanship was poor in many instances, this study took 
great care when citing from his correspondence. The quotations use the original spelling 
and abbreviations found in the dispatches. When parroted directly from a telegram, this 
study preserves the original spelling, grammar, and abbreviations. With these 
precautions, this project seeks to reveal the full extent and significance of Dana' s 
function as Assistant Secretary of War. 
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CHAPTER II 
DANA BEFORE WASHINGTON CITY, THE WAR DEPARTMENT BEFORE DANA 
There are several areas, beyond his dealings with General Ulysses S. Grant, in 
which Charles Dana significantly contributed to the Union war effort. First examining 
the nature of the relationship between Dana and Secretary Edwin M. Stanton, this chapter 
then focuses on the development of the Secretary' s trust in Dana. Secretary Stanton had 
several Assistant Secretaries during the war; however, Dana was one ofthe longest 
tenured and the only one Secretary Stanton appointed to serve twice. While their alliance 
was turbulent at times, Dana's personality and qualities earned him Secretary Stanton's 
confidence, allowing Dana to perform a multitude of tasks while he was in Washington 
City from the middle of 1864 until he resigned after the war. Second, it considers the 
extensive reforms and expanded authority of the War Department during this period, 
which dramatically increased the Secretary of War's responsibilities and required that he 
appoint numerous assistants to oversee the department's increased workload. Secretary 
Stanton' s transformation of the War Department not only made subordinates, such as 
Dana, an essential part of the Union war effort; it also compounded the need for the 
Secretary of War to rely on them implicitly. 
The Journalist before the War 
Compared to his later years, historians know relatively little about Dana' s early 
life. Born in New Hampshire in 1819, Dana excelled in his coursework as a youth in 
Vermont and developed a natural affinity for languages. 1 His success in school followed 
1 James Harrison Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907), 2-
3. 
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him to Harvard in 1839; however, he never graduated.2 Instead, after two years, he 
became a member of Brook Farm, a utopian community in Massachusetts, where he 
taught Greek and German and worked on his first newspaper: the Harbinger. 3 Here, he 
met his future employer, Horace Greeley, who had recently established the New York 
Tribune.4 Throughout the remainder of their lives, this relationship would prove 
tumultuous at times. However, they always shared liberal economic and social interests.5 
When the Harbinger folded in 1846, Dana began his career with the New York 
Tribune, where he worked until the beginning stages ofthe American Civil War. One of 
his first assignments was in Paris, France covering the 1848 revolutions erupting 
throughout the European Continent.6 While there, Dana adopted Marxist ideas, including 
that of class struggle, which reaffirmed his commitment to social change in America. 7 
Throughout the 1850s, as the New York Tribune' s readership expanded, Dana became a 
highly paid editor, second only to Greeley, and a very influential American figure. 
However, another aspect of his time at the Tribune that likely contributed to his tenure 
with Secretary Stanton was Greeley's personality. In many ways, Greeley mirrored 
Stanton's insistence for hard work and perfection.8 Although Dana worked for Greeley 
for more than a decade, Dana never commented on how these experiences affected his 
personality, taught him how to deal with difficult people, or become a stronger 
2 Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 30; Janet E. Steele, The Sun Shines f or All: Journalism and 
Ideology in the Life of Charles A. Dana (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 7. 
3 Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 32, 36, 51 ; Steele, The Sun Shines f or All, 13, 16; Henrietta 
Dana Raymond, Sophia Willard Dana Ripley: Co-Founder of Brook Farm (Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. 
Randall, 1994), 32-33, 38. 
4 Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 40; Steele, The Sun Shines f or All, 14. 
5 Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 63 ; Steele, The Sun Shines for All, 15. Even though Dana 
fostered very liberal social and economic views in his early years, later he became a rather conservative 
figure and his political enemies and competitors criticized him for his previous positions. 
6 Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 62. 
7 Steele, The Sun Shines f or All, 25. Wilson disagrees with Steele, asserting that Dana did not 
become an abolitionist until later in the 1850s. See Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 116. 
8 Steele, The Sun Shines for All, 29. 
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individual, but it undoubtedly strengthened his character, or at the very least, prepared 
him for the enormous demands Secretary Stanton bestowed on his subordinates. 
Democratic Stanton 
Secretary Stanton' s sweeping reforms m the War Department greatly expanded 
the scope of its responsibilities. As many of Dana's duties as Assistant Secretary of War 
in Washington City involved managing these newly acquired obligations, it is essential to 
understand these changes and why the Secretary undertook added responsibilities when 
the enormity of overseeing the military was already daunting. Born December 19, 1814, 
Stanton grew up in a religious family. 9 He became interested in social issues, and his 
enthusiasm for devouring William Lloyd Garrison' s abolitionist paper, the Liberator, 
suggests that he had similar leanings. 10 However, until his appointment as Secretary of 
War under the Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, all of his political offices, 
beginning with his election as a prosecuting attorney in Ohio, were as, or under a 
Democrat. 11 Eventually, Stanton became involved with President James Buchanan's 
administration providing legal justifications for his actions. After Jeremiah S. Black, 
President Buchanan's Attorney General, urged Stanton to come to Washington City, he 
read in the newspaper that, on Black' s advice, the president had appointed him the next 
9 Thomas, Benjamin P. and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln 's Secretary 
of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 5-6; Fletcher Pratt Stanton: Lincoln 's Secretary of War (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1953), 3. Thomas and Hyman assert that Stanton came from a Methodist family, 
whereas Pratt asserts that the Stanton was a descendant of Quakers. 
10 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 11 , 31 , 42; Frank Abial Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton: The 
Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation, and Reconstruction (New York: Saalfield, 1905), 31 . Thomas and 
Hyman cite further evidence that Stanton was an abolitionist based in the underlying tones and comments 
in his correspondence with Salmon P. Chase, who would serve in Lincoln's administration as Secretary of 
the Treasury. 
11 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 2 1; Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton, 36. 
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Attorney General. 12 In this position, he firmly established the priorities that would guide 
his actions as Secretary of War. 
Following the 1860 presidential election, but before Lincoln's inauguration, 
several states seceded from the Union, dividing President Buchanan's predominately 
Southern administration. 13 Both Buchanan and Stanton actively sought to avoid the 
outbreak of war and prevent further disunion until Lincoln took office on March 4, 
1861. 14 One aspect of Stanton's experiences during this crisis echoes his later reforms 
and policies as Secretary of War. Before President Lincoln's inauguration, the 
government began investigations to thwart subversion of federal employees in 
Washington City. 15 Fearing that Southern sympathizers would attempt an insurrection 
and establish a provisional Confederate government in Washington City, Stanton worked 
with the Howard Committee, a Congressional body that Representative William A. 
Howard formed to investigate government officials that Unionists believed threatened to 
surrender federal installations, such as forts, and quell their efforts. 16 
Two components of Stanton's involvement with these inquiries mirror his future 
activities as Secretary of War. First, he was committed to the Union' s preservation. 
Subversive activities would jeopardize President Lincoln' s attempts to reunite the nation, 
and Stanton wanted to mitigate these risks. He also understood the damage seditious acts 
12 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 90-91 ; Pratt, Stanton, 93. 
13 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 89; Pratt, Stanton, 113. 
14 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 107, 11 2; Pratt, Stanton, 113; Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton, 
100-102. For information concerning President Buchanan's efforts to secure the Union until Lincoln 's 
inauguration, consult William W. Freehling' s The Road to Disunion: Volume II Secessionists Triumphant, 
1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 488 and James M. McPherson and James K. 
Hogue, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 20 I 0), 145-47. 
Freehling draws attention to President Buchanan ' s activism in attempting to reinforce Fort Sumter as a 
motivation for other Southern states to follow South Carolina' s lead and secede before President Lincoln's 
initial call for troops, including Georg ia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 
15 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 110; Pratt, Stanton, 112. 
16 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, I 08, II 0. 
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would have as well as the urgency needed to thwart them. 17 Stanton's devotion to this 
did not diminish after he became Secretary of War. In an 1864 telegram to Major 
Wiegel, a Provost Marshal in Baltimore, Maryland, Secretary Stanton declared, "Let the 
enemies of the government show their hands." 18 
The second component of Stanton's actions reveals his exceptional political skills. 
He had to balance the exigency of pursuing those plotting to destroy the Union, while 
maintaining the appearance of adhering to President Buchanan's policy of Southern 
conciliation represented in the Crittenden Compromise.19 Stanton would later use this 
political skill and combine it with a fervent desire to preserve the United States to oversee 
the essential activities for the Union war effort at. the War Department. 
Following his involvement with President Buchanan, Stanton was not optimistic 
about the future, completely lacking confidence in Lincoln's abilities.20 Upon President 
Lincoln's inauguration, Stanton could only watch as the new executive built his 
administration.21 Although Stanton served in no formal capacity, he did maintain contact 
with key individuals, notably Secretary of State William Seward, Secretary of War Simon 
Cameron, and Attorney General Joseph Holt. Stanton also actively contributed to the 
17 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 113-14; Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton, 98-104. Flower's 
account does not include Stanton's involvement with any compromise. Instead, Flower asserts that "if 
Stanton had not entered the [Buchanan] cabinet and clung to it and fought in it to the end in spite of 
indignities, disagreements, false words, betrayals, and broken promises, the Federal capital and its archives 
and the machinery of the Government would have fallen into their [Confederate] hands as planned; and 
Jefferson Davis instead of Abraham Lincoln would have been inaugurated in Washington and perhaps, as 
was hoped, without bloodshed." While there is no evidence to uphold these claims, Stanton' s contributions 
to preserving the Union in both accounts are similar, supporting this study's assertion that Stanton placed a 
very high value on thwarting the efforts to subvert the Union. 
18 Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, to Major Wiegel, Provost Marshal Baltimore, Maryland, 
May 22, 1864; Vol. 187, p. 452; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 -July 30, 188 / 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 89); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
19 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, I 12. 
20 Pratt, Stanton, 141 . 
21 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 119. 
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expansion of the War Department after the firing on Fort Sumter and again following the 
First Battle of Bull Run, providing Secretary of War Cameron with recommendations for 
appointments and assisting him to formulate legal justifications for his actions, as he had 
done for President Buchanan?2 
Members of Lincoln's administration, however, disapproved of Secretary 
Cameron. While the diversity of reasons for Secretary Cameron' s dismissal extends 
beyond the purview of this study, two aspects of his removal were important to 
revamping the War Department that would later affect Dana. First, Stanton had the 
support of members ofthe administration when he became Secretary of War, especially 
Secretary Seward?3 Second, Stanton' s reforms created the necessity for capable 
subordinates to oversee the War Department's new responsibilities. Without such a 
transformation, Dana' s actions in the war would not have had such significance. 
Revitalizing the War Department 
On January 20, 1862, Lincoln appointed Stanton Secretary of War. He 
immediately attacked his duties with gusto. While the War Department had already 
expanded in 1861, Secretary Stanton continued to transform it into a bureaucratic 
machine with additional authority and responsibilities, necessitating the appointment of 
assistants to oversee many of these new functions. Two related components of Secretary 
Stanton's changes, which this study classifies as the revitalization of the War 
22 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 126. 
23 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 135; Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton, 117. 
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Department, are pertinent to Dana's tenure in Washington City from 1864 to 1865: 
suppression of fraudulent contractors and disloyal activities.24 
Prior to the American Civil War, the United States had never been in a situation 
requiring the mobilization of massive forces. While this presented problems relevant to 
the organization and sustainment of fielded forces, it also provided Secretary Stanton 
with a unique opportunity. Due to the conflict' s nature and size, the Secretary of War's 
authority was undefined, permitting Stanton to specify and expand the department' s 
responsibilities?5 Historians contend that the degree to which Secretary Stanton 
increased his power as well as President Lincoln's demands necessitated this; however, it 
was clear that the Secretary needed little encouragement. Similar to his involvement with 
the Howard Committee, Secretary Stanton immediately purged the War Department of 
individuals that the Congressional Potter Committee accused of disloyal activities.26 He 
did not stop there. He secured Secretary of State William Seward's investigative 
organization, relocating it in the War Department under Assistant Secretary Peter 
Watson.27 Eventually, it would become one of Dana's major responsibilities. It also 
established the framework for Dana's initial involvement with the War Department. 
Before examining Dana's role in the War Department as well as his relationship 
with Secretary Stanton, it is necessary to understand Stanton's personality. While his 
disposition was important to the way the War Department functioned, it did cause some 
problems. The trust established between Secretary Stanton and Dana was due to Dana's 
24 For this study, disloyal activities includes Confederate subversive actions in addition to those 
who disregarded federal leg islation and military policies to assist the Confederacy directly (providing arms) 
and indirectly (importing industrial equipment in exchange for cotton, tobacco, cash, etc.). 
25 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 143. 
26 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 108, 147-48; Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton, 119. 
27 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 153. 
23 
ability to cope and thrive under Secretary Stanton, an attribute Dana revealed in a speech 
he presented to the New Haven Colony Historical Society. He declared that Stanton 
"was very intense, and one of the most eloquent men that I ever met. He was entirely 
absorbed in his duties."28 As opposed to Cameron' s leadership, Secretary Stanton' s 
administration represented a "time of action."29 Three and a half decades after working 
for the Secretary, Dana commented that Stanton's "energy was something almost 
superhuman, and when he took hold of the War Department the armies seemed to grow, 
and they certainly gained in form and vim and thoroughness."30 Perhaps this drive 
impressed Dana the most, as he remarked, "I never knew a man who could do so much 
work in a given time."31 
Despite Secretary Stanton's energy and eloquence, Dana also highlighted his less 
attractive qualities. According to Dana, Stanton was "impulsive, warm-blooded, very 
quick in execution, perhaps not always infallible injudgment."32 He was "a nervous 
man, a man of imagination"33 One story in Dana' s Recollections exposed the Secretary's 
less glamorous side. On the evening of election day 1864, members of Lincoln's 
administration nervously awaited the returns.34 When Dana entered the Secretary of 
War's office, he found President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton. During a brief pause in 
the returns and to ease the tension, President Lincoln asked Dana to come and sit with 
28 Charles A. Dana, Lincoln and his Cabinet: A Lecture Delivered on Tuesday, March I 0, 1896, 
before the New Haven Colony Historical Society (Cleveland, OH: De Vinne, 1896), 20. 
29 Dana, Lincoln and His Cabinet, 21. 
30 Dana, Lincoln and His Cabinet, 20. 
3 1 Dana, Lincoln and His Cabinet, 26. 
32 Dana, Lincoln and His Cabinet, 26. It is very possible that when Dana refers to Secretary 
Stanton's fallacious judgment, he is referring to Stanton's impetuous removal of Dana as Assistant 
Secretary of War in November 1862. 
33 Dana, Lincoln and His Cabinet, 26. 
34 Chapters III and IV of this study examine several of the reasons for this anxiety and incorporate 
aspects of Dana's contributions to President Lincoln 's reelection. 
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him, inquiring whether he had read any of Petroleum V. Nasby' s writings, an American 
political commentator and humorist.35 Dana responded that he had reviewed a few and 
found them amusing, to which Lincoln pulled out a piece, "Well, let me read you a 
specimen. "36 
Dana recalled, "Mr. Stanton viewed these proceedings with great impatience, as I 
could see, but Mr. Lincoln paid no attention to that. He would read a page or a story, 
pause to consider a new election telegram, and then open the book again and go ahead 
with a new passage."37 Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase ended this humorous respite 
when he interrupted to introduce another individual to the President.38 Secretary Stanton 
then requested that Dana accompany him to an adjoining room. After the war, Dana 
clearly recollected, "I shall never forget the fire of his indignation at what seemed to him 
to be mere nonsense."39 Dana continued, "The idea that when the safety of the republic 
was thus at issue, when the control of an empire was to be determined by a few figures, 
the leader, the man most deeply concerned, not merely for himself but for his country, 
could tum aside to read such balderdash and to laugh at such frivolous jests was, to his 
[Secretary Stanton' s] mind, repugnant, even damnable."40 
Dana, who usually remained calm in numerous stressful environments, 
commented on the Secretary' s tirade, stating, Stanton "could not understand, apparently, 
that it was by the relief which these jests afforded to the strain of mind under which 
Lincoln had so long been living, and to the natural gloom of a melancholy and 
35 Charles Anderson Dana, Recollections of the Civil War: With Leaders at Washington in the 
Field in the Sixties (New York: D. Appleton, 1898), 261 . 
36 Quoted in Dana, Recollections, 261 . 
37 Dana, Recollections, 261-62. 
38 Dana, Recollections, 262. 
39 Dana, Recollections, 262. 
40 Dana, Recollections, 262. 
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desponding temperament . .. that the safety and sanity of his intelligence were 
maintained and preserved.'.41 While this was hardly Secretary Stanton's only frenzy, it 
was the most memorable Dana witnessed at the War Department and served to highlight 
the eccentric Secretary's passion and personality that Dana contended with throughout 
his tenure, especially as Assistant Secretary of War in Washington City. 
Dana as an Agent of the War Department 
When the American Civil War erupted at Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861 , Dana 
was a highly successful editor of the New York Tribune. His writings reveal little desire 
to wmk for Lincoln' s admimstration in any capacity. However, a year later a senior 
member of the newspaper' s board approached Dana to inform him, "Mr. Greeley would 
be glad to have me resign."42 While Greeley never specified the exact reason, Dana 
inferred that it was because "while he was for peace I was for war, and that as long as I 
stayed on the Tribune there was a spirit there which was not his spirit - that he did not 
like.'.43 Upon his departure, Dana received a message from the newly appointed 
Secretary of War, who, having observed Dana, offered h_im an appointment to work at the 
War Department.44 
One of the most famous cries in the North before the First Battle ofBull Run, 
credited to Greeley, was "Forward to Richmond."45 Its call for a more aggressive Union 
strategy mirrored the views Dana presented in his editorials, prompting Stanton to send 
4 1 Dana, Recollections, 262. 
42 Dana, Recollections, I . 
43 Dana, Recollections, 1-2; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 171. Wilson argues that the real 
reason for Dana's dismissal was " Dana was too aggressive, too positive, too self-confident, and too active 
to travel longer in harmony with Greeley. Their divergent opinions about the war had brought them to the 
parting of the ways.'· 
44 Dana, Recollections, 2; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 190. 
45 Ha1 ry J. Maihafer, The General and the Journalists: Ulysses S. Grant, Horace Greeley, and 
Charles Dana (Washington, DC: Brassey ' s, 1998), 69. 
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Dana an oft-quoted message declaring, "This army has got to fight or run away; and 
while men are striving nobly in the West, the champagne and oysters on the Potomac 
must be stopped.'.46 While revealing Stanton·s vtews on the activities of the Army of the 
Potomac under the command of General George B. McClellan, this communication also 
indicates that as early as January 1862, Stanton recognized that the pro-Lincoln Dana 
could be an asset to the Union 's cause and hoped to cultivate a relationship. He declared, 
"I know the task that is before us - I say us, because the Tribune has its mission as 
plainly as I have mine, and they tend to be the same end.''47 He clearly wanted to harness 
Dana' s literary qualities to help maintain support for the Union cause and "rally around 
me.'' but Secretary Stanton also recognized his ·need for an individual with Dana' s 
qualities to assist in managing the influx of responsibilities that accompanied the War 
Department's revitalization.48 
One month after Dana' s resignation from the New York Tribune, Secretary 
Stanton hired him to audit the accounts of a quartermaster in Cairo, Illinois.49 The 
Quartermaster Corps was ill-prepared to handle the massive number of requisitions and 
contracts that the Union rumy required. While some quartermasters made numerous 
mistakes, others undoubtedly took advantage of the situation for personal gain, resulting 
in accounts with numerous problems. 5° Compounding this issue, newspapers cited 
evidence of fraudulent and corrupt requisitions. 51 Oapa's commission quickly completed 
46 Quoted in Dana, Recollections. 5; Wilson, The Ltfe of Charles A Dana, 166; Maihafer, The 
General and the Journalists, 69. 
47 Quoted in Dana, Recollections, 5. 
48 Quoted in Dana, Recollections, 5. 
49 Dana, Recollections, 11 ; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. [)ana, 190. 
so Dana, Recolleccions, 12; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 191 . 
s 1 Dana, Rer:ol/ections, 12. 
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its inquiry, uncovering a relative lack of corruption. 52 His involvement with this case, 
however, became important to the development of trust between Secretary Stanton and 
Dana. 
Through previous correspondence, the Secretary of War believed Dana to be an 
ardent Union supporter. However, Dana's acuity as a newspaper editor was different 
from that required of agents at the War Department. For example, while Dana' s early 
assignments used his ability to communicate situations at the front accurately; these 
talents did not necessarily relate to a natural perspicacity to oversee large operations. 
Therefore, Secretary Stanton had to gauge Dana's ability to handle managerial aspects of 
the department. The Secretary's firm stance on corrupt and fraudulent procurement 
practices required increased activity at the War Department. He needed a capable 
assistant to oversee these functions. Auditing a quartermaster' s accounts presented a 
suitable situation to test Dana's qualifications for such a position. Clearly, he passed this 
test as Secretary Stanton offered Dana the job of Assistant Secretary of War that 
November. 53 
Things, however, did not start out smoothly. A miscommunication occurred 
almost immediately between the two. In an unfortunate coincidence, Dana met an old 
acquaintance, Charles G. Halpine, formerly a journalist, but currently a major in the 
Union army. 54 Without thinking, Dana told Major Halpine that Secretary Stanton had 
appointed him Assistant Secretary of War. Major Halpine then informed his newspaper 
contacts in New York, who printed the story the next morning. 55 Secretary Stanton felt 
52 Dana, Recollections, 15. 
53 Dana, Recollections, 16; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 194. 
54 Dana, Recollections, 16; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 194. 
55 Dana, Recollections, 16-! 7; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 194. 
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that this was a breach of confidentiality and abruptly withdrew his offer. 56 Dana had lost 
the Secretary' s confidence, which Dana worked to regain over the course of 1863 and 
1864. 
While this incident temporarily prevented Dana from assuming a position at the 
War Department in Washington City, Secretary Stanton still had a use for the former 
editor. The Union war effort was experiencing mixed results. In May 1862, the war was 
not going well for the North in the east. After the defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run, 
General George B. McClellan assumed command of the Anny of the Potomac. While 
Secretary Stanton initially liked this fellow loyal Democrat, the failure of the Peninsula 
Campaign in the spring and early summer of 1.862 exposed the general' s weaknesses. 57 
The situation in the west, however, was very different. General Grant was a rising star. 
After capturing Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February 1862, he orchestrated a 
seemingly miraculous reversal of Union fortunes with a costly victory at the Battle of 
Shiloh in April. Officials in Washington City, however, were receiving troubling rumors 
that General Grant was frequently intoxicated. 58 President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton 
needed to verify these reports before deciding the general ' s future. 59 The individual 
selected for this task was Dana. His time with General Grant would become a vital 
aspect for improving Dana's relationship with the Secretary. 
56 Dana, Recollections, 16; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 194-95. 
57 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton, 127-28. 
58 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), 226. 
Williams asserts that President Lincoln was the one who wanted to verify General Grant' s conduct; 
however, as head of the War Department, Secretary Stanton most likely wanted to verify these reports as 
well. 
59 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 226. Williams argues that President Lincoln may have 
even initiated the idea of sending Dana to veri fy the troubling reports concerning General Grant. 
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To conceal Dana' s true purpose, Secretary Stanton declared that Dana was a 
commissioner sent to audit payments to Union soldiers in the western theatre.60 Although 
he had met General Grant previously, this was Dana' s first opportunity to interact with 
the Army of the Tennessee' s senior officers.61 At General Grant's headquarters in 
Milliken's Bend, Mississippi, Dana also confirmed his abolitionist sympathies, which 
would later influence his actions as Assistant Secretary of War, particularly in regards to 
the Emancipation Proclamation. Having spent the majority of his life in the Northeast, 
Dana had only a brief exposure to slavery during previous assignments in the Border 
States. Therefore, this journey was his first trip into the Deep South. As he recalled, "it 
was not until I saw these great Louisiana plantations with all their apparatus for living 
and working that I really felt the aristocratic nature of the institution, and the infernal 
baseness of that aristocracy. "62 At thjs point, he still believed in social justice and these 
experiences only reaffirmed these beliefs. He declared, "Every day my conviction was 
intensified that the territorial and political integrity of the nation must be preserved at all 
costs, no matter how long it took."63 It was not Dana's exposure to slavery, however, but 
his interactions with the Union commanders that pr~vided the cultivation of trust with the 
Secretary of War. 
Upon Dana' s arrival, General Grant was developing a plan to capture Vicksburg. 
Seizing this strategic position on a bend in the Mississippi River would permit the North 
to control the river, effectively severing Texas from the rest of the Confederacy. Dana 
accompanied General Grant' s army throughout this campaign, providing Secretary 
60 Dana, Recollections, 22; Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 200-20 I. 
61 Dana, Recollections, 15. Dana first met General Grant when he was part ofthe War Department 
and temporarily stayed in Cairo, Illinois, the location of General Grant's headquarters at the time. 
62 Dana, Recollections, 29. 
63 Dana, Recollections, 29. 
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Stanton with constant updates on the Army of the Tennessee' s progress.64 Since military 
historians have examined Union operations to seize this vital position, this study will not 
reiterate those events.65 Instead, it will focus on Dana' s dispatcheG detailing General 
Grant's activities to the Secretary of War. 
Throughout May 1863, numerous engagements o~curred between Union and 
Confederate forces around Vicksburg. With the defeat of the Confederates outside the 
fortress, General Grant ordered a frontal assault against the massive defense works. 66 As 
the South continued to repulse these attacks, Dana's messages to the War Department 
reveal an increased fondness for General Grant as a commander as well as faith in his 
capabilities. Based on his success at Vicksburg and in successive engagements, Dana's 
judgment also bolstered Secretary Stanton's trust in his agent. 
General Grant ordered two major frontal assaults before deciding to besiege the 
enemy. The first occurred on May 19. While Dana' s report covered the day's events, it 
did not highlight the Union' s failure to take the rebel's trenches. Instead, Dana 
emphasized that for several days, the Union iorces had driven the Confederates under 
General John C. Pemberton into his Vicksburg trenches, resulting in the capture of 
approximately five thousand prisoners and a reduction in the number of Confederate 
64 Ulysses S. Grant: Memoirs and Selected Lellers, ed. Mary D. and William S. McFeely (New 
York: Literary Classics ofthe United States, 1990), 325. Dana composed a large portion of the 
correspondence included in the repott s surrounding the Union operations to capture Vicksburg contained in 
the Official Records. 
65 For such works, consult Samuel Carter Ill ' s The Final Fortress: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 
1862-1863 (New York: St. Martin' s, 1980) and William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winsche l '~ Triumph and 
Def eat: The Vicksburg Campaign (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003). 
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66 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 34 I. 
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defenders to around 15,000 to 20,000.67 Instead of describing the Union failed attack, 
Dana's report merely stated, "There was sharp fighting through the day yesterday."68 
After this failure, General Grant carefully prepared a second strike. Launched on 
May 22, the Confederates again repulsed the attack. Dana' s report, however, stated that 
the Union assault failed, "but without heavy loss." 69 He blamed these unsuccessful 
charges not on General Grant' s orders, but on faulty information that General John C. 
McClernand, a political general from Illinois, provided.70 Dana declared that General 
McClernand had reported that his forces had captured "two forts of the rebel line, was 
hard pressed, and in great need of re-enforcements."71 General Grant responded to these 
erroneous reports, ordering renewed drives that were "disastrous."72 Dana noted that the 
Union lost approximately 1,500 soldiers, "though but for McClernand ' s mistake it would 
have been inconsiderable."73 Dana's Recollections do not paint a favorable picture of 
General McClernand, averring, "he had not the qualities necessary for commander even 
of a regiment."74 Clearly, Dana's dispatches from Vicksburg reveal an ulterior motive. 
He not only distanced General Grant from the negative aspects of these operations, but 
also blamed disappointments on commanders he disliked. It is important to note that 
67 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebel/ion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 86. 
68 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation ofthe Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 86. 
69 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser. , 24, part I (Washington, DC), 86. 
70 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 334. 
7 1 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebel/ton: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser. , 24, part I (Washington, DC), 86. 
72 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, 151 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 86. 
73 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I" ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 87. 
74 Dana, Recollections, 59. 
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Union casualties from the incidents on May 19 and 22 were over four thousand, the same 
number lost the previous three weeks during a series of engagements. 75 
General Grant soon realized that Dana was not an auditor, but a highly influential 
advocate with the War Department. Approximately one week after the failed assaults, 
General Grant composed a dispatch to Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, the Union 
commander in charge of the Department of the Gulf, informing him that he was sending 
Dana to plead for the Army of the Tennessee' s request for reinforcements. 
Understanding the influence that Dana wielded as an agent of the War Department, 
General Grant declared, "I have nothing further to add since my last that Mr. Dana cannot 
communicate more fully than can well be done iri a written statement." 76 In debating 
General Grant's ascendancy to overall commander of the Union forces, several have 
emphasized Dana' s contributions.77 However, in view of Dana's future positions in the 
War Department, Grant's military successes, particularly at the Second Battle of 
Chattanooga, only served to augment the trust that Secretary Stanton had in Dana' s 
judgment. 
Secretary Stanton's opinion of Dana increased throughout 1863, as he 
accompanied Union forces during two other major operations. In both instances, Dana 
used his spare time to write his opinions of numerous Union commanders to the Secretary 
of War. These provided Secretary Stanton with detailed information about officers of 
various ranks in different armies that he would have lacked without Dana. He included 
75 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 341. 
76 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 87. 
77 See Wilson, The Life of Charles Dana, 245; Maihafer, The General and the Journalists, 184; 
and Charles Vincent Spaniolo, "Charles Anderson Dana: His Early Life and Civil War Career" (doctoral 
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1965), 3. 
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several letters about officers of the Army of the Tennessee in his Recollections. The first 
analyzed those who held combat commands at the division and brigade levels. His 
succinct descriptions revealed not only the individual ' s ability to command, but at what 
level Dana believed they would be most suited. For example, in describing General A. J. 
Smith, a career cavalry officer, Dana stated that his division had a reputation for slow 
movements and that while Smith was a good officer, he "should not be intrusted with any 
important independent command."78 
In addition to combat officers, Dana also commented on those in support 
positions. His descriptions offer colorful portrayals that the Secretary of War must have 
found informative. Discussing the Quartermaster· Corps, Dana declared that one 
commander "is an invalid almost, and I have never seen him when he appeared to be 
perfectly well; but he is a man of first-rate abilities and solid character."79 While 
determining the effect that these opinions had on officers' promotions is beyond the 
scope of this study, Charles Vincent Spaniolo in "Charles Anderson Dana: His Early Life 
and Civil War Career," asserts that those receiving favorable comments from Dana to the 
Secretary of War advanced their military careers. 80 Additionally, Spaniolo contends that 
those whom Dana did not find to possess praiseworthy attributes suffered. 81 While the 
extent ofthese claims is debatable, it does support the argument that the Secretary of War 
trusted Dana' s judgment. 
His duties in Washington City required that Secretary Stanton could rely on Dana 
to make important, and often legal, decisions that would affect the Union war effort. His 
78 Dana, Recollections, 65. 
79 Dana, Recollections, 73 . 
80 Spaniolo, "Charles Anderson Dana," 3. 
81 Spaniolo, "Charles Anderson Dana," 3. 
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admirable performance as an agent of the War Department with the Army of the 
Tennessee restored Secretary Stanton's original opinion of Dana that had been tarnished 
in the 1862 incident with Major Halpine. While the majority of Secretary Stanton's 
correspondence was devoted to official business, he did express his approval of Dana's 
performance in a telegram on June 5, 1863. While still with General Grant's forces at 
Vicksburg, Secretary Stanton informed Dana, "Your telegrams are a great obligation, and 
are looked for with deep interest. I cannot thank you as much as I feel for the service you 
are now rendering." 82 
Dana's reports on Union commanders, however, were not perfect. With the Army 
of the Tennessee, he provided almost constant communication with the War Department, 
which Secretary Stanton appreciated. The Union commanders also realized that Dana 
continuously updated the Secretary of War. For that reason, these commanders could 
construe Dana's recommendations as a suggestion from the Secretary of War. On April 
12, 1863, while the Army ofthe Tennessee moved into position around Vicksburg, Dana 
sent Secretary Stanton a telegram discussing the activities of various officel's during the 
army' s movements. In this dispatch, Dana stated, " I have remonstrated, so far as I could 
properly do so, against intrusting so momentous an operation to McClemand, .. . but 
General Grant will not change."83 Believing Dana had overstepped his authority, 
Secretary Stanton declared, "Allow me to suggest that you carefully avoid giving any 
advice in respect to commands that may be assigned, as it may lead to misunderstanding 
82 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I st ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 93. 
83 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 74. 
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and troublesome complications."84 While there is no record that Dana committed a 
similar error later in the field, this telegram reveals that he sometimes exceeded his 
authority. 
Secretary Stanton's Experiences with Thomas A. Scott as Assistant Secretary of War 
Not all of Secretary Stanton's subordinates performed to his high standards. To 
understand why Secretary Stanton selected Dana to oversee many functions in the War 
Department as well as the extent of their relationship, it is important to highlight the 
attributes of other assistant secretaries. One of his first was Thomas A. Scott, who 
provides a good comparison because he and Dana both performed similar investigative 
functions. Scott' s reaction to Secretary Stanton's abrasive personality, however, was 
very different from Dana's, highlighting Stanton' s need for individuals with strong 
personalities to work for him. The fact that Dana thrived as an editor of the New York 
Tribune probably assisted him at the War Department and undoubtedly contributed to his 
second appointment. 
To stop the fraudulent procurement practices of the Quartermaster Corps, 
Secretary Stanton sent Scott to St. Louis. Revealing that "more than 50% of regulation 
goods" were of ir.ferior quaiity and purchased at full price, Scott relayed General 
Halleck' s opinion that "some equitable arrangements be made by the Government by 
which justice, at least, may be done the soldiers. "85 While most of Scott ' s documentation 
to the Secretary of War appears to be of sufficient quality, Secretary Stanton was 
unimpressed. It was not merely their performance that separated them, but Scott's 
84 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 24, part I (Washington, DC), 75. 
85 Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of Wa1, February 
9, 1862, Edwin McMasters Stanton Papers (ro ll 2). Chapter Two examines Dana's role in delivering the 
justice that Scott's message seeks. 
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inability to handle Secretary Stanton· s direct and harsh remarks. While the Secretary's 
initial comments are unknown, when compared to Dana, Scott was inferior. In a message 
to Secretary Stanton on February 7 specifying the necessity of coordinating the activities 
oftwo Union commanders, Scott declared, "Your message of yesterday hurt me. It is all 
past now- under any + all circumstances you may rely upon me doing my duty to the 
best of my ability."86 While not perfect and sometimes crossing beyond his purview, 
there is no evidence that Dana declared that Secretary Stanton offended Dana's honor or 
that the Secretary's remarks miffed him. No record exists that clearly explains why 
Secretary Stanton decided to appoint Dana as Assistant Secretary of War, but it is likely 
that Dana's ability to handle the Secretary of War's unique personality was an important 
factor. 
A Second Chance as Assistant Secretary of War 
Dana' s work in 1862 and 1863 allowed him to reestablish a good relationship 
with the Secretary. Dana's reports often went beyond the Secretary' s expectations, and 
Dana' s ability to handle Stanton's unpredictable personality, just as Dana had done under 
Horace Greeley, helped to separate Dana from other War Department agents. All of 
these factors contributed to Dana's advancement during the middle phases of the war, 
culminating in his reappointment as Assistant Secretary of War after the fall of 
Vicksburg. 87 However, it would be a full year before he became fully involved in the 
activities of the War Department in Washington City. Until then, Secretary Stanton 
86 Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, February 
7, 1862, Edwin McMasters Stanton Papers (ro ll 2). The underline in the quote is original; however, as this 
message was most likely a telegram it is possible that Secretary Stanton underlined this comment 
personal i~ and this copy was the one that is now located in Secretary Stanton's papers. 
8 Dana, Recollections, I 03 . Even though Secretary Stanton appointed Dana Assistant Secretary 
of Warm 1863, it was not official until January 26, 1864. 
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required Dana's services with the Army of the Cumberland, reporting on the Union 
defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga and the retreat to Chattanooga. His performance 
throughout this campaign not only won him the recognition of other members of 
President Lincoln's administration, but also further cultivated his relationship with 
Secretary Stanton. 88 
. As General Grant was besieging Confederate forces in Vicksburg and the Army 
of the Potomac was defeating General Robert E. Lee' s Army of Northern Virginia at the 
Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate General Braxton Bragg' s Army ofTennessee retreated 
from central Tennessee with General WilliamS. Rosecrans' s Army of the Cumberland 
slowly in pursuit.89 President Lincoln urged General Rosecrans to attack the 
Confederates at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Secretary Stanton sent Dana to accompany 
the army. Unlike previous assignments, Dana's orders clearly conveyed that he was there 
as a liaison between the Union army and the War Department, as he secretly had been at 
Vicksburg.90 While General Grant had given him a cordial reception, General Rosecrans 
"burst out in angry abuse of the Government at Washington," complaining that it had not 
supported his efforts.91 Professionally responding to the general' s displeasure, Dana 
informed him, "I have no authority to listen to complaints against the Government. I was 
sent here for the purpose of finding out what the Government could do to aid you, and 
have no right to confer with you on other matters."92 
88 Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase' s only mention of Dana in his diary concerns the 
in formation included in Dana' s dispatches. See Inside Lincoln 's Cabinet: The Civil War Diary of Salmon 
P. Chase, ed. David Donald (New York: Longmans, Green, 1954), 200, 202. 
89 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 36 1. 
90 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 30, part 3 (Washington, DC), 229. 
9 1 Dana, Recollections, 107. 
92 Quoted in Dana, Recollections, I 07. 
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While General Rosecrans's performance at the Battle of Chickamauga was not 
stellar, by the time Dana reached the Army of the Cumberland, Rosecrans had skillfully 
maneuvered around Chattanooga, dislodging the Confederate defenders without a major 
engagement.93 Pursuing the Confederates south, the two forces clashed on September 19 
and 20, 1863. Dana's reports on the progress of this battle would gain him recognition in 
President Lincoln' s cabinet as an important asset to the War Department. 
The first day at Chickamauga went well for the Union. Dana attentively sent 
eleven dispatches to Secretary Stanton. While declaring that the Union suffered heavy 
casualties from the Confederate attacks, Dana optimistically, and wrongfully, reported, "I 
do not yet dare to say our victory is complete, but it seems certain. "94 The following day 
was different. General Rosecrans misunderstood reports from his commanders 
concerning a gap in the Union line, and in an attempt to rectify the situation, created a 
hole for the Confederates to attack.95 As the South struck, Dana witnessed chaos as the 
right flank folded in retreat. After the war, he recalled, "the first thing I saw was General 
Rosecrans crossing himself ... 'Hello! ' 1 said to myself, 'if the general is crossing 
himself, we are in a desperate situation. "'96 Making his way back to Chattanooga, Dana 
telegraphed Secretary Stanton .. Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull 
Run."97 
As the telegraphs reached the War Department, members of President Lincoln' s 
administration tned to understand the situation. Secretary of the Treasury Chase cited 
93 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 362. 
94 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I st ser., 30, part I (Washington, DC), 191. 
95 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 363. 
96 Dana, Recollections, 115. 
97 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Officiai Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I 51 ser., 30, part I (Washington, DC), 192. 
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Dana's telegraphs as a source of much sought after information.98 As President Lincoln 
and Secretary Stanton began to comprehend the events in Tennessee, Lincoln requested 
additional details to determine the level of assistance required.99 In response, Dana began 
sending all the information he could gather beginning with the day of the retreat. He first 
telegraphed the War Department informing Washington that General George H. 
Thomas's Corps, augmented by additional Union troops, had shielded the Union retreat, 
and over ten thousand cavalry and mounted infantry soldiers were "perfectly intact."100 
As more details emerged, his reports provided the number of casualties and effective 
strength. 101 These telegrams conveyed the necessity for reinforcements, and, when 
combined with the effectiveness of Secretary Stanton's War Department, led to the rapid 
redeployment of twenty thousand troops from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of 
the Cumberland. 102 
With General Rosecrans poor performance at Chickamauga, President Lincoln 
placed the Union forces at Chattanooga under General Grant's command. Still with the 
Union army, Dana witnessed General Grant's coordinated attack on the Confederate 
positions on November 24 and 25, 1863. In his telegram to Secretary Stanton on the 
afternoon of November 25, Dana declared, "Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. 
Missionary Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas' troops, and 
98 Chase, Inside Lincoln ·s Cabinet, 200, 202. The mention of Dana's dispatches at the Battle of 
Chickamauga is Secretary Chase's only reference to Dana in this diary. 
99 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 28 1. 
100 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I st ser., 30, part I (Washington, DC), 193. 
101 General Thomas's reports provide the specifics Dana had for that particular time; for example, 
declaring that a specific division lost one third of its men. See U.S. War Department, The War oft he 
Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, I st ser. , 30, part 1 
(Washington, DC), 195. 
102 See John E. Clark Jr.'s "A Serious Disaster: The Federal Government Responds to Defeat at 
Chickamauga" in Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 200 I), 141 - 159; McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 365-66. 
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rebels routed. Hooker has got in their rear."103 Chattanooga became the last major 
engagement Dana witnessed in 1863. He spent the winter of 1863-1864 briefly 
performing duties for the War Department before accompanying General Grant and the 
Army of the Potomac, on its campaign from Spotsylvania to Petersburg in the spring of 
1864. Throughout this campaign, Dana again served as a liaison between the War 
Department and the Union army. With the Army of the Potomac stalled at Petersburg, 
Dana returned to Washington City for the remainder of the war. His service there 
represents a part of his Civil War career as important to the federal war effort as his 
duties had been when he accompanied the Union army. 104 
Conclusion 
With the revitalization of the War Department, Secretary Stanton needed an 
individual he could rely on to oversee the extensive responsibilities now within his 
department's jurisdiction. While Watson helped Secretary Stanton build the War 
Department' s bureaucratic infrastructure, Dana oversaw it during the crucial period of 
1864 and 1865. An essential component of reestablishing the Secretary of War' s faith in 
Dana' s abilities was his tremendous performance reporting on the activities of the Union 
forces he accompanied. As the Battle of Chickamauga revealed, President Lincoln and 
the War Department needed detailed information to make effective decisions concerning 
supplies, reinforcements, commanders, and other aspects of the war. Dana's reports 
provided this information, and his attention to detail, the performance of his duties, and 
his strength of character handling Secretary Stanton' s personality, gradually reinforced 
the Secretary of War' s confidence. The diversity of the department' s responsibilities 
103 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, I st ser., 30, part I (Washington, DC), 195. 
104 Dana, Recollections, 186-223; Wtlson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 316-33 1. 
from 1864-1865 necessitated this degree oftrust, as the only way Secretary Stanton's 
War Department could handle everything under its jurisdiction was through capable 
subordinate officials like Dana. 
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CHAPTER III 
WAR DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
The second chapter addressed Charles Dana's early life including his involvement 
with General Ulysses S Grant and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's revitalization of 
the War Department. Combining the effects ofStanton·s plans and Dana' s managerial 
acuity, this third chapter discloses the Assistant Secretary of War's contributions to the 
Union war effort, focusing primarily on his assistance investigating fraudulent and 
suspicious activity under the War Department's jurisdiction. Exploring how the 
department conducted these inquiries, specifically those concerning the Provost 
Marshals, it outlines the diverse cross-section of cases that Dana oversaw. These include 
probes into fraudulent contractors, dishonest government employees, blockade-runners, 
state officials attempting to steal the 1864 presidential election, in addition to 
newspapers' unauthorized publication of sensitive material. Concluding with an example 
of Dana's participation in arbitrary arrests, it exposes him as a skillful administrator for 
the War Department. More importantly, despite accusations of his indiscriminately 
arresting innocent citizens, he executed these duties fairly, but finnly. 1 His contributions 
reveal that he and the organization he managed were essential to the government' s 
endeavors to prosecute fraudulent contractors and others intent on harming the Union war 
effort. This also shows that this increased level of federal authority led to some abuse, of 
which Dana was an active participant. 
1 John A. Marshall ' s American Bastille: A History of the Illegal Arrests and Imprisonment of 
American Citizens in the Northern and Border States, on Account ofTheir Political Opinions during the 
Late Civil War (Philadelphia: Thomas W. Hartley, 1881) is one oft he more critical examinations of the 
War Department and the federal government's investigative practices. Despite his highly-biased approach, 
Marshall provides solid information concerning specific events used in this analysis. 
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War Department Investigators 
Who conducted these investigations? In simple term<;, they were military and 
civilian agents of the War Department, in addition to federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officials, including marshals and nonmilitary contractors. Excluding the 
actions of specific agents, as Dana rarely dealt with them, this examination focuses on 
those who employed and supervised them, especially those east of the Mississippi River. 
Dana's Recollectzons, James Harrison Wilson's biography, and numerous official 
dispatches refer to this organization by several names including the National Detectives 
and the Secret Service.2 Therefore, this analysis employs the all-inclusive term Agents 
of the War Department when referring to offici~ls, including civilians, involved in 
conducting these investigations, performing arrests, and overseeing the initial detainment 
of the accused. 3 
The prir.1ary group composing the Agents of the War Department was the Provost 
Marshals. While past versions handled only issues concerning soldiers, during the Civil 
War the group had broader responsibilities.4 It was the muscle behind the War 
Department's mission to quell suspicious and fraudulent activities within the civilian 
population and arrest individuals according to Dana's and his superiors' orders.5 Even 
though the primary historiographical emphasis has centered on the Eastern Theater, 
2 Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War: With the Leaders at Washington and in the 
Field in the Sixties (New York: D. Appleton, 19 13), 236. 
3 Compounding this confusion, Dana' s memoir refers to Lafayette C. Baker as the chief detective 
of the War Department, even though he frequently signed his dispatches Colonel and Agent of the War 
Department. Colonel HenryS. Olcott' s designation as Special Commissioner of the War Department 
constitutes a similar situation. The Secret Service also oversaw Union spy activities; however, these are 
beyond the scope of this study. The authoritative work that examines the Union's spy and espionage related 
activity, albeit sparsely sourced, is Edwin C. Fishel's The Secret War for the ·Union: The Untold Story of 
Military Intelligence in the Civil W'ar (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 
4 Wilton P. Moore, "Union Atmy Provost Marshals in the Eastern Theater," Military Affairs 26, 
no. 3 (Autumn 1962): 120. 
5 Moore, "Union Army Provost Marshals,'' 120. 
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colonels throughout the North as well as Union occupied territory conducted similar 
functions. With this extensive authority, the organization's proper functioning and 
management was essential for Dana to perform inquiries and apprehend guilty parties. 
There are two components of the War Department' s prosecution of fraudulent 
activities. First, widespread discontent and criticism over the federal contracting system 
began almost immediately after the eruption of hostilities. On May 25, 1861, the New 
York Tribune published an editorial entitled "Army Peculators," in which the author 
chastised the middlemen that emerged throughout the North as contractors. Reflecting 
the Northerners' feelings, the piece declared "how anybody but fiends can, for lucre, 
willfully palm off upon the Government, sleazy and rotten blankets, and rusty and putrid 
pork, to cover by night, and food by day, our brave sons and brothers who are enduring 
unwonted fatigue, and braving death, in defense of our country passes comprehension."6 
The editor compared these contractors to "Vultures that prey upon the hearts of the dead 
on the battle field," advocating, "They must be summarily dealt with, and at the very 
beginning of the war before their crime becomes chronic."7 The Tribune' s warning 
proved prophetic, as problems with fraudulent contractors continued throughout the war. 
While the Northern populace was never content with the federal government's ability to 
6 
"Army Peculators," New York Tribune, May 25, 1861 . 
7 
"Army Peculators," New York Tribune, May 25, 1861 ; Mark R. Wilson, The Business of Civil 
War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865 (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
2006), 151 . Wilson also declares that other newspapers throughout the North reprinted this editorial. 
As neither Horace Greeley nor Charles Dana signed their editorials, it is unknown whether Dana 
wrote this column. However, James Harrison Wilson declares that Dana wrote the editorials advocating, 
"the Unton was in its very nature indissoluble," whereas Greeely' s editorials conveyed the possibility of 
peaceful succession. Applying this critirea, the tone of this message reveals that Dana most likely 
composed this message. Additionally, this is fitting, as Dana was a senior War Department official charged 
with ending these abuses that he so clearly articulated in this piece, as this chapter shows. For more 
information, consult James Harrison Wilson, The Life of Charles Anderson Dana (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1907), 160. 
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deal with the5e injustices; Stanton's War Department became a !t.:ader in thwarting these 
efforts.8 
Congress, reacting to Northerners' displeasure and demands for punishing 
offenders, passed a law expanding the federal government's authority to deal with 
businesses that failed to satisfy the stipulations agreed to in their contracts. Over a year 
after the New York Tribune ' s editorial , Congress passed a statute on July 17, 1862, which 
declared: 
any person who shall contract to f'Umish supplies of any kind or description for 
the army or navy he shall be deemed and taken as a part of the land or naval 
forces of the United States, for which he shall contract to furnish said supplies, 
and be subject to the rules and regulations for the government of the land and 
naval force of the United States.9 
Such legislation provided the War Department with the same jurisdiction over its 
contractors as it had over its soldiers, giving it the right to arrest suppliers violating their 
agreements, try them in a military court, and punish them at the discretion of the 
Secretary of War. Northerners demanded the punishment of these "vultures." After 
Dana came to Washington City, this became his responsibility, which he executed fairly 
and firmly. However, it would prove to be much more difficult than the black and white 
nature alluded to in the editorial. 
Fraudulent Contractors 
One business that Dana's agents discovered that violated its contracts was Place 
and Furlay, a coffee roasting company in New York. Even though this case was 
relatively minor, it illustrates Dana's role, authority, and impartiality throughout the 
8 Wilson, The Business ofCivil War, 190. 
9 
"An Act to provide for the more prompt Settlement of the Accounts of Disbursing Officers," 
Thirty-Seventh Congress, Session II, Chapter200, Section 16 (July 17, 1862) in Public Laws ofthe United 
States of Amen ca, Passed at the First Sessions of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, 1861-1862, ed. George P. 
Sanger (Boston : Little, Brown, 1861 ), 596. 
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inquiries he oversaw. On February 1, 1865, be received affidavits from Colonel 
Lafayette C. Baker in New '.' ork, one of his most successful investigators, declaring that 
Place and Furlay "have committed enormous frauds on the Government."10 To prevent 
further abuse, Colonel Baker advised the suspension of all payments to them, which Dana 
did in an order to the Commissary General of Subsistence in New York. 11 
Baker's initial report, however, was faulty. Upon hearing of the inquiry, the 
company, renamed J. K. and E. B. Place, as Furlay had left the organization, wrote to 
their United States Senator, Edwin D. Morgan, who, in turn, forwarded the 
correspondence to Dana. 12 It clarified their situation and presented a reliable witness 
familiar with government contracting, who pleaded for a retraction of the order 
suspending payment, as it was interfering with the company's current operations as well 
as its ability to fulfill subsequent orders totaling three thousand dollars. 13 In exchange, 
the company's 0wners agreed to "become personally responsible to the extent of one 
hundred thousand dollars or more if required that they [the company' s owners] will be 
ready whenever they are wanted to testify and that their books will be open at all times to 
10 Lafayette C. Baker, War Department Agent, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, 
February I, 1865; Case 770B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-
1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of the Adjutant General ' s Office, 
1780' s-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
11 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Brigadier General Amos B. Eaton, Commissary 
General of Subsistence, February 2, 1865; Case 770B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records ofthe 
Adjutant General ' s Office. 1780's- 1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
12 J. K. and E. B. Place, coffee and tea producer, to Edwin D. Morgan, United States Senator from 
New York, Februal) ~. 1865; Case 770B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C Turner and Lafayette C. 
Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm PublicatiOn M797, roll 136); Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, 1780's-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
13 Edwin D. Morgan, United States Senator from New York, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant 
Secretary of War, Fehruary 3, 1865; Case 770H; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayett~ C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records ofthe 
Adjutant General's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94, National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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the inspection of any one appointed by the Government " 14 Contractors frequently 
attempted to bargain with the War Department to ease their punishment or expunge their 
reputations. Until the examination concluded, Dana took no action, as this matter and the 
company's lost profits did not concern him. The department's inquiry took less than a 
week. On February 6, Dana informed the Commissary General of Subsistence in New 
York to revoke the previous order as the investigation concluded: the contractor sold the 
goods with the aforementioned issues to the public, not the govemment. 15 While only a 
minor case, it demonstrates the balance of fair-mindedness and resolve Dana exhibited. 
A case exposing the potential complexity of these investigations and the extent 
Dana's managerial skills were necessary to balance the multitude of duties he performed 
in Washington City concerned a fraudulent tent contractor. On October 21, 1864, 
Colonel Olcott received a report concerning deficiencies in the hospital tents Lewis, 
Boardman, and Wharton supplied to the Schuylkill Arsenal in Pennsylvania. It claimed 
that the tents were four and a half yards deficient and calculated that the duck cotton, 
burlaps, weight lines, and the string saved the contractor $9.825 per tent. 16 Colonel 
Olcott informed Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton that the one thousand tents they 
delivered did not meet the specifications of their May 20, 1864 contract and requested 
14 Edwin D. Morgan, United States Senator from New York, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant 
Secretary of \Var, February 3, 1865; Case 770B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of the 
Adjutant General ' s Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
15 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Brigadier General Amos B. Eaton, Commissary 
General of Subsistence, February 6, 1865; Case 7708; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records ofthe 
Adjutant General's Office, 1780's-19 \7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
16 A. Flomerfelt, War Department Inspector, to Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of 
the War Department, October 21 , 1864; Case 7438; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records ofthe 
Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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that they deposit the sum of $9,825 to compensate the United States Treasury. 17 He 
concluded stating, "It is proper to add that the Government has no information of any 
criminality on your part; but it would appear that the firm had by some means been 
unwittingly led into the error of supplying tents which did not conform to the standard." 18 
Had the contractor simply reimbursed the government, this would probably have ended 
the matter. 
Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton, however, chose to dispute Colonel Olcott' s 
request. Accompanying their payment, the contractor declared, "we pay this amount 
under protest and as all the circumstances are fully known to you we ask and shall expect 
from you whenever this subject comes befor.e the War Department, such a statement ... 
that we shall not suffer a greater loss than is right andjust." 19 They also alluded to their 
perceived unjust treatment at the hands of Colonel Olcott. For example, "The trimmings 
including the Burlap Sod Cloth were the same that the Government had been receiveing 
in all the different Departments as standard, they were the same as we were authorized to 
put upon the Tents by the Government officials, and had any other been used by us the 
17 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Messers Lewis, 
Boardman, and Wharton, tent contractor, January 9, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi 
C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); 
Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780' s-19 17, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC. 
18 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, tent contractor, January 9, 1865; Case 7438; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Laf ayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
19 Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton, tent contractor, to Colonel Henry S. Olcott, Special 
Commissioner of the War Department, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi 
C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); 
Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's- 1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC. 
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Tents would not have been received."20 Posing a rhetorical question, they concluded, 
"And as you are aware we believe the Government have purchased Burlaps 3 months 
after they refused ours for the purpose of using them as Sod cloths on Hospital Tents, 
then why condemn ours?"21 Colonel Olcott was intolerant of such accusations and his 
subsequent correspondence bore a strikingly harsher tone. 
No uniform policy for tent procurement existed; therefore, the officers in charge 
of" the several purchasing depots" were responsible for their own contracts.22 
Consequently, the contractor' s error was its failure to abide by the standards the 
procurement officer established in the initial contract. Informing the company of this 
process, Colonel Olcott added that the individual they cited as furnishing those 
requirements "was arrested and is now under bonds to appear before a court-martial to 
answer charges of fraud in collusion with certain contractors. The Government has 
distinctly repudiated his acts as unauthorized and criminal in the cases of Cozens and 
others."23 To ensure that Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton understood his displeasure, 
Colonel Olcott concluded, "I do not see how any distinction can be made in your favor," 
20 Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton, tent contractor, to Colonel Henry S. Olcott, Special 
Commissioner of the War Department, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi 
C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); 
Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94 ; National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC. 
21 Lewis, Boardman, and Wharton, tent contractor, to Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special 
Commissioner of the War Department, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi 
C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); 
Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC. 
22 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, tent contractor, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General ' s Office, 1780's-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
23 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, tent contractor, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Laf ayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780' s-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
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and furthermore, "there is apparent reason for the application of an old principle of law 
that fraud vitiates a contract; and hence you must suffer the penalty of the ignorance, 
negligence or criminality of your agent.''24 The letter's most important aspect, however, 
was not its content, but its acknowledgement of Dana' s initial involvement. Colonel 
Olcott "made a complete report of this case and transmitted it with all the papers, to the 
Hon C. A. Dana, Asst Sec of War who will place them on file in the Department, whence 
they can be produced at any time when the subject shall be finally adjudicated." 25 
The tone, structure, and professionalism of Colonel Olcott's reply reveals much 
about the organization Dana managed. First, had the contractor silently paid for their 
malfeasance, the War Department would probably have dropped the matter with only a 
copy of the report filed in its records. Second, Colonel Olcott's calm response to Lewis, 
Boardman, and Wharton's brazen letter, demonstrated his competence to handle the 
department's inspectors and ensure that the federal government dealt with its contractors 
in a courteous and professional manner. These attributes allowed Dana to trust his 
subordinates, reducing the necessity to micromanage them and seldom requiring his 
direct involvement in an investigation. However, when the contractor's challenge 
threatened Colonel Olcott's authority, it escalated the situation. 
The importance of this case also illustrates the proficiency ofDana's subordinates 
to perform their duties. Henry Lewis, a member of the board of directors of Lewis, 
24 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, tent contractor, January I 0, 1865; Case 743 B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780' s-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
25 Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, tent contractor, January I 0, 1865; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Lafayette C. Baker, .1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Pub~ication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-19! 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
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Boardman, and Wharton, later wrote a subdued letter to Dana tactfully explaining the 
details of their situation and accepting responsibility for their errors. He ended his 
message acquiescing, "for any loss which the Go\'~:rnment may have suffered on account 
of the improper manufacture of our tents by him. we hold ourselves responsible and are 
willing to make good."26 Thus, the contractor attempted to rectify its relationship with 
the War Department to prevent problems attaining future cpntracts. Upon compensating 
the government fm the error and no longer contesting Colonel Olcott' s judgment, Dana 
chose not to arrest and court~martial thern.27 Dana's primary interaction, therefore, was 
to handle the distribution of the contractor' s payment by placing it in the Treasury 
Department "to the credit of the appropriation for Camp and Garrison Equipage."28 
Throughout the conflict, the War Department signed thousands of contracts for 
goods from coffee and tents, to housing federal criminals in state~run prisons, and 
railroad transportation. Companies, however, still attempted to thwart the stipulations of 
their agreements to obtain greater profits. Verifying that the goods provided met the 
government's expectations proved to be a cumbersome task. Therefore, midway through 
26 The date of this message is of great concern. Although Henry Lewis declared, " I wrote and 
subscribed Before me this 3d day of November A.D. 1864" and had a Notary Public sign this statement as a 
witness, the tone of this message is inconsistent with the letter the company sent to Colonel Olcott in 
January 1865. Had Henry Lewis really desired to "make good," he would have done so upon receipt of 
Colonel Olcott ' s initial correspondence, which was extremely cordial. For these reasons, the author 
believes that Lewis intentionally attempted to deceive Dana. By separating himself from the rest of the 
board of directors, he made an effort to prevent his company from losing the various other contracts his 
firm enjoyed throughout the war. Affidavit, Henry Lewis, member of the board of directors of Lewis, 
Boardman, and Wharton, November 3, 1864; Case 743B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner 
and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 136); Records of 
the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's- 1917, Rtcord Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC. 
27 There is no record of Dana ordering the arrest of any member of this contracting company in the 
case file or in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. · 
28 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Colonel H. Biggs, Quartermaster stationed in 
Philadelphia, Januaty II , 1865; Case 7438 ; Case Files of Invest igations by Levi C. Turner and Laf ayette C. 
Baker, 1861-/866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M 797, roll 136); Records of the Adjutant 
General 's Office, 1780's-19 t 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Buiiding, Washington, DC. 
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the war, many army quartermasters began to violate the intent of the War Department's 
policy. Realizing that contracting also led to in~ated prices, the quartermasters 
sometimes purchased goods on the open market without formal agreements, similar to the 
way they operated in emergencies.29 
Not only quartermasters, but also many Northern civilians became displeased 
with a system where business leaders were making potentially large profits while others 
bore the burden of combat.30 They realized that the procurement system favored 
contracts that concentrated wartime profits in the hands of a relatively few large 
companies instead of small businesses and created midd1emen, such as Lewis, Boardman, 
and Wharton, who made large profits without producing any goods.31 These factors 
combined to heighten the already negative feelings towards civilian contractors, exhibited 
in the New York Tribune's May 1861 editorial, creating a desire to investigate suspected 
abuses and then punish responsible parties.32 Dana and the War Department played an 
integral role in this process by providing a legal counterweight. In overseeing not only 
inspectors, investigators, arresting authorities, but also those who judged and punished 
the parties committing fraud, Dana became respons1ble for easing this civilian discontent. 
While the War Department's efforts to alleviate this despondency were unsuccessful, 
Dana's attempts to stymie fraudulent business practices became an important element in 
regulating some control over the massive procurement system, which expanded to meet 
29 Wilson, The Business ofCivi/ War, 138. 
30 Wilson, The Business ofCivil War, 107. 
3 1 Wi lson, The Business of Civil War, 147. 
32 Wilson, The Business of Civil War, 147. 
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the war' s demands. 33 However, it was not only the contractors, but also members ofthe 
Quartermaster Corps who received kickbacks and bribes from prospective suppliers. 
Questionable Quartermaster Activity 
While chapter four discusses the structure and the divisions within the 
Quartermaster Corps, there were officers within the hureau throughout the North as well 
as those accompanying army field units who also had the authority to purchase needed 
goods. The size of many of these transactions and the competition between contractors 
allowed these officials to defraud the federal govemment.34 When suspicions arose that 
someone was taking advantage of his position for personal gain, Dana's War Department 
Agents investigated. One such case involved ColonelS. L. Brown of the Quartermaster 
Corps stationed in New York. His actions demonstrate the variety of ways in which 
unscrupulous individuals could defraud the government. 
E. B. Clark, a clerk in Colonel Brown' s office in charge of overseeing the 
procurement of forage, was the primary witness to the quartermaster' s questionable 
actions. Beginning in August 1864, Clark noticed that Colonel Brown sent his brother-in-
law to Chicago to purchase forage, but soon after, began paying Webster and Baxter for 
New York forage. In November and December, Colonel Brown as well as Webster and 
Baxter started circumventing established War Department procedures for contracts. Per 
established policy, the least expensive bid received the contract with monthly purchases 
equal to the going market rate. Baxter and Webster, however, charged the Quartermaster 
Corps six to ten cents above the current market rate.15 When Clark informed Colonel 
33 Wilson, The Business ofCivil War, 190. 
34 Wilson, The Business of Civil War, 159. 
35 Affidavit, E. B. Clark, clerk of Colonel S. L. Brown; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861- 1866 (National Ardt~ves Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
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Brown of this fraudulent billing, he dismissed it and paid the invoice without abatement, 
asserting that Webster and Baxter had properly billed the government.36 
Noticing that Colonel Brown continued to pay his brother-in-law, who was no 
longer associated with the Quartermaster Department in New York, Clark decided to 
review previous transactions, uncovering more evidence of fraudulent practices. At the 
beginning of 1864, Colonel Brown had sent an agent to Canada to buy grain with gold he 
purchased several months prior in New York. Filling out the agent's voucher, Colonel 
Brown requested the gold's highest market price and issued a voucher for that amount.37 
The agent, therefore, not only received the actual cost of the grain, twenty-nine cents 
above the current New York rate, but also the difference between the purchasing and 
selling price of the gold. 38 Clark also discovered that this was a common practice for 
Colonel Brown who had several agents that he paid on commission.39 Other dubious 
practices, such as circumventing government inspectors, compounded these discoveries. 
These actions represented a wide-range of illegal procurement practices that the War 
134); Records ofthe Adjutant General 's Office, 1780 's-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
36 Affidavit, E. B. Clark, clerk of Colonel S. L. Brown; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
134); Records ofthe Adjutant General ' s Office, 1780' s-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
37 Affidavit, E. B. Clark, clerk of Colonel S. L. Brown; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
134); Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
38 Affidavit, E. B. Clark, clerk of Colonel S. L. Brown; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
134); Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780' s-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
39 Affidavit, E. B. Clark, clerk of Colonel S. L. Brown; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
134); Records of the Adjutant General ' s Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
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Department and the American public loathed. Upon learning of these accusations, Dana 
and his agents initiated an inquiry. 
Colonel Olcott' s cursory investigation revealed highly worrisome practices. In a 
telegram on March 23, 1865, he informed Dana '·The case of Col Brown and his oats is 
very bad Shall I not make a thorough investigation? It would take long and will show up 
a bad state ofthings."40 Instead of launching a full-scale inquiry, however, Dana 
requested that Colonel Olcott send the War Department Clark's affidavits and "proceed 
no farther in the Brown affair without special directions to that effect. The matter is for 
the present to be kept in strict confidence .. '41 On March 31 , about a week after Colonel 
Olcott initiated his examination, Dana filed his.final report to the Secretary of War. In it, 
Dana refers to an affidavit that Colonel Brown had submitted, which is not present in the 
case file nor is there a record of it in the collections of letters and telegrams that the War 
Department received. Dana concluded, " In my judgment all the charges adduced by 
Clark are satisfactorily explained by Col. Brown. I am convinced that he has managed 
the business of purchasing forage with skill efficiency and honesty and that his operations 
have been highly advantageous to the Government.'"'2 
While this investigation's rapid conclusion, like that of the coffee and tent 
contractors, was common, the lack of pw1ishment for the blatant abuse of authority 
4° Colonel HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the War Department, to Charles A. Dana, 
Assistant Secretary of War, March 23, 1865; Vol. 245, p. 12 1; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of 
War, April 15, /861 - Mat ch 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 7); Records 
ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
4 1 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to HenryS. Olcott, Special Commissioner of the 
War Department, March 23, 1865; Vol. 186, p. 46; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/ 27, 1861 
- July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll88); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Buiiding, Washington, DC. 
42Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, March 3 1, 
1865; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by Lev1 C. Turner and Lqfayette C Baker, 1861-1866 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 134); Records of the Adjutant General' s Office, 
1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, OC. 
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evident in Clark's affidavit is not. The recommended punishment, the removal of Clark' s 
immediate superior, Captain E. D. Chapman, was odd.43 In Dana's Recollections, he 
discusses another case of a fraudulent contractor in whil·h President Lincoln offered a 
more moderate punishment. Looking back Dana avers, "my own reflections upon the 
subject led me to the conclusion that the moderation of the President was wiser than the 
unrelenting justice of the Assistant Secretary would have been. "44 
Without Colonel Brown's affidavit, ether possibilities remain to explain Dana's 
recommendation. For example, severaJ months prior, Dana received telegrams from 
Colonel Brown concerning acquiring advance funds to purchase the next month's forage 
at the current extremely low rates, an action that showed initiative and an attempt to save 
the government procurement costs. 45 As Dana and Colonel Brown had already 
established a relationship, a seemingly complete reversal in his behavior would have 
surprised Dana. Additionally, Captain Chapman, as Clark's superior, would have 
provided the information to initiate the investigation. Chapman could have altered facts 
to show his innoccn<-e while implicating Colonel Brown, who was legally responsible for 
all of the activities and contractors his subordinates handled. While impossible to prove, 
it would explain Dana's recommendation to the Secretary of War. In addition, without 
concrete evidence to support Captain Chapman's involvement in fraudulent activities, it 
43 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, March 3 1, 
1865; Case 624B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 186 /- /866 
(National Archives Microfilm Publ ication M797, roll 134); Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 
1780' s- l 917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building. Washington, DC. 
44 Dana, Recollections, 164. 
45 S. L. Brown, Assistant Quartermaster. to Charlc;s A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of Wat , October 
5, 1864; Vol. 24 1, p. 427; Telegrams Received by the SecretaJy of War, Apri/15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 115); Records of the Office of the Sel-retary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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would be difficult to convict him in court-martial proceedings. Therefore, it would have 
been easier and completely within Stanton·s authority, to relieve him from duty. 
In addition to investigating fraudulent civilian contractors, Dana and his agents 
functioned as an internal affairs division, inquiring about the activities of Union military 
officers. The North struggled with these problems throughout the war. For example, in 
June 1864, Ohio' s Congressman Robert C. Schenck debated legislation to decentralize 
procurement to allow the army's quartermasters to purchase goods on the free market, 
pem1itting free competition between individual producers, as opposed to professional 
contractors.46 These investigations were cumbersome, but essential to ensure that 
civilians and government employees were not using the war for their own personal 
advantage. Dana's leadership made these offenders accountable for their actions, while 
protecting the American soldiers and taxpayers. 
Illegal Trade and Blockade Runners 
A central tenet of the Union's grand strategy was to establish a blockade to 
disrupt trade to the rebellious states and cripple its economy. Many textile 
manufacturers, however, were opposed to this policy. They depended on Southern cotton 
for their products, creating a demand for those willing to risk capture and prosecution to 
trade illegally with the Confederate states.47 Dana had become fami liar with this illicit 
commerce during his time as a member of an auditing commission and a free cotton 
trader when he advocated that the War Department suspend all permits because the trade 
46 Cong. Globe, 381h Cong., I st Sess. (28 June 1864); Wilson, The Business of Civil War, 144. 
47 James M. McPherson and James K. Hogue, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
41h ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 20 I 0), 238-39. 
Even though there was illicit trade with the Confederacy throughout the war, the Union blockade, 
coupled with Southern farmers only plantmg one third of their 1860 crop in 1862 was successful. The 
British, the most lucrative importer of Southern cotton, imported only one percent of its 1860 level in 1862. 
Additionally, many producers switched from cotton to linen and woolen. 
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harmed the Union war effort.48 He continued to prosecute illicit cotton trade, while in 
Washington City, authorizing the capture and punishment of those ignoring the Union 
blockade, as they provided food, weapons, and other supplies to the rebels in exchange 
for cotton, tobacco, or other goods. 
On November 3, 1864, Dana received a report from Colonel Baker that Morris 
Greenwald of McArthur and Company was preparing to sail from New York to Havana, 
Cuba with a large quantity of blockade goods and Confederate currency.49 Dana then 
consulted Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, who provided legal advice and 
justification for many of the President' s and the War Department' s actions. With Holt' s 
permission from the Bureau of Military Justice, Dana authorized Colonel Baker to arrest 
Greenwald, who was in possession of a large sum of Confederate monetary capital 
connected to the sale of goqds to individuals in the South. Holt felt that this made the 
seizure of Greenwald and the aforementioned bonds and notes justified. 50 Upon receiving 
Holt's decision, and by the order of President Lincoln, Dana issued authorization for 
Major General John A. Dix to arrest Greenwald. 51 His apprehension took place that very 
day. The speed of this event is truly impressive considering that it required coordinating 
the actions of at least four people (Colonel Baker, Dana, Holt, and General Dix) in order 
48 Dana, Recollections, 18. 
49 Lafayette C. Baker, Coionel Provost Marshal, to Charles A Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, 
November 3, 1864; Case 696B; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 
1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 135); Records of the Adjutant General' s 
Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
50 Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General, November 3, 1864; Case 696B; Case Files of 
Investigations by Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M797, roli 135); Records of the Adjutant General' s Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; 
National Archives RuJiding, Washington, DC. 
51 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John A. Dix, Commander Department of the 
East, November 3, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 185; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861-July 
30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary 
ofWar, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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for Dana and Holt to review Colonel Baker's cursory findings, make an official 
judgment, and then execute the authority of their respective posts all by 10:40 a.m.52 
After Greenwald's arrest, Colonel Baker conducted a normal investigation and 
presented his findings to Dana. Greenwald 's New York defense counsel argued that he 
had fled the Confederacy and taken an oath of allegiance to the United States and " in no 
way violated that oath, but has always remained, and now is a true and loyal citizen."53 
Using collaborating evidence from the affidavits of Thomas S. Knox, a former Captain 
and Commissary in the Confederate army, and Theodore Woodall, a former police 
detective for Confederate Brigadier General John H. Winder, Colonel Baker and his 
associates discovered that Greenwald was indeed a fervent supporter of the Confederate 
cause and active blockade-runner. Furthermore, both Knox and Woodall revealed 
Greenwald's intention to transport "Cotton Machinery and Cotton Cards" to Havana and 
then return with banned goods and smuggle them through the New York Customs 
House. 54 
Knox and Woodall make it clear that Greenwald was not merely an opportunistic 
businessman, but also a Southern sympathizer. Knox recalled that on multiple occasions, 
52 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John A. Dix, Commander Department of the 
East, November 3, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 185; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - July 
30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll87); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
53 William L. Gardner, Commissioner of Deeds Norfolk County Jail , to Charles A. Dana, Assistant 
Secretary of War, November 25, 1864; Case 6968 ; Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and 
Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 135); Records ofthe 
Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
54 Affidavit of Thomas S. Knox, former Captain and Commissary in the Confederate Army who 
defected and now a witness in Colonel Baker's investigations; Case 696B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
135); Records of the Adjutant General 's Office, 1780's-191 7, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC; Affidavit of Theodore Woodall, former detective police officer of Brigadier 
General John H. Winder who defected and now a witness in Colonel Baker' s investigations; Case 696B; 
Case Files of Investigations by Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M797, roll 135); Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1780's- 191 7, Record 
Group 94; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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and in the presence of others, Greenwald had "made and in a boastful manner, drank a 
toast to the health and honor of Jeff. Davis."55 Even though he did not testify to these 
incidents, Woodall stipulated that while in New York, Greenwald received an offer for an 
unspecified position in the federal government, which he declined because "he was to 
good a Southern man to accept any position under Lincoln."56 From these affidavits and 
the evidence Colonel Baker discovered in Greenwald' s possession, it was clear that 
Greenwald actively participated in illicit trade with the Confederacy on multiple 
occasions. After Dana' s investigation, Greenwald was no longer a detriment to the 
Union blockade. 57 
While the War Department could not capture every blockade-runner, the extent, 
competence, and authority of Dana's agents permitted the federal government to act 
swiftly to seize suspected illegal traders. In Stanley Lebergott's examination of the 
profitability of blockade-runners, he analyzed the average spccess rate in evading capture 
as well as their expected profits for a successful run. In 1864, the year of Greenwald' s 
case, the success rate was 52.6 percent. 58 However, there is a very impottant aspect that 
Lebergott neglects to include: the likelihood of capture once a blockade-runner arrived in 
Northern ports. Once agents cooperating with the War Department discovered 
55 Affidavit of Thomas S. Knox, former Captain and Commissary in the Confederate Army who 
defected and now a witness in Colonel Baker' s investigations; Case 696B; Case Files of Investigations by 
Levi C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1866 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M797, roll 
135); Records of the Adjutant General' s Office, 1780' s-1917, Record Group 94; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
56 Affidavit of Theodore Woodall, former detective police officer of Brigadier General John H. 
Winder who defected and now a witness in Colonel Baker's investigations; Case 696B; Case Files of 
Investigations by Lev1 C. Turner and Lafayette C. Baker, 1861-1806 (National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M797, roll 135); Records ofthe Adjutant General' s Office, 1780's-1917, Record Group 94; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
57 Throughout the remainder of Dana's tenure in the War Department, there is no further 
correspondence relating to Greenwald. 
58 Stanley Lebergott, "Through the Blockade: The Profitability and Extent of Cotton Smuggling, 
1861-1865," Journal of Economic History 41 , no. 4 (December 1981 ): 874. 
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potentially illegal trade, Dana wa.:: able to orchestrate the arrest of the suspected 
individuals in as little as several hours. Thus, the chance for success was actually 
substantially lower than Lebergott's original calculations, which undoubtedly assisted the 
Union in thwarting the Confederacy's trade. Furthermore, this quick response was 
possible due to the effective management of the Agents of the War Department under 
Dana' s direction. 
Attempted Fraud in the 1864 Presidential Election 
While Dana was helping arrange for the arrest of Greenwald, he was also 
involved in investigating voter fraud. In the months before the election, the New York 
State Legislature passed a bill authorizing its servicemen to vote in the upcoming election 
by absentee ballot. To prevent either party from exploitjng this practice, the law also 
stipulated that the state send a commissioned officer to oversee the process. 59 When the 
state's Democratic Governor, Horatio Seymour, failed to receive the Republican ballots 
or an answer to his request to appoint two joint commissioners from his Secretary of 
State, Chauncey M. Depew, Governor Seymour appointed them himself.60 He also 
selected three others to perform completely unrelated functions: Colonel Samuel North, 
Major Levi Cohn, and Lieutenant Morven M. Jones.61 Meanwhile, Lincoln's 
administration received information of possible voting fraud after the apprehension of 
two New York Democratic agents on October 26.62 At this time, Dana's organization 
provided the most effective way to detain suspected agents and conduct these inquires, as 
59 John A. Marshall, American Bastille, 560-61 . 
60 Joseph George Jr., "The North Affair· A Lincoln Military Trial, 1864," Civil War History 33, 
no. 3 (September 1987): 20 I. 
61 George, "The North Affair," 199. Governor Seymour had appointed Colonel North as a New 
York State agent in Washington City, Major Cohn as a state paymaster, and LieuLenant Jones to ass ist those 
New York soldiers currently recuperating in Washington hospitals. 
62 George, "The North Affair," 20 I; MarshalL American Bastille. 56 1. 
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the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation and other national investigation entities did not yet 
exist. Using the information available, Dana authorized his agents to arrest Colonel 
North, Major Cohn, and Lieutenant Jones under the orders of President Lincoln, marking 
the beginning of Dana's extensive involvement to uncover instances of voter fraud. 63 
With only a few weeks until November 8, the Agents of the War Department had 
to find the names and locations of individuals from New York attempting to swing the 
election in favor of Democratic candidates. On October 19, Colonel Baker found one. 64 
In a frantic order to Major General Gouverneur K. Warren on October 20, Dana 
stipulated that Governor Seymour had employed Felix McCloskey, a known "ballot box 
stuffer" from California "employed in frauds+ forgeries like those in which other agents 
of Gov. Seymour have been detected here."65 By the order of the Secretary of War, Dana 
ordered General Warren to arrest McCloskey if he was in the area.66 
In addition, the War Department received disturbing reports indicating that 
officers under Major General Marsena R. Patrick's command were giving Democratic 
New York agents, with or without fraudulent intentions, " favors and furnishing them with 
facilities not warranted by the passes granted them by this Department." 67 Dana 
63 Marshall, American Bastille, 561. 
64 Lafayette C. Baker, Agent of the War Department, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, October 29, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 426; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April I 5, I 86 I -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 116); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
65 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Gouverneur K. Warren, Union military 
commander in the east, October 30, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 144; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 
27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll87); Records ofthe Office 
of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washmgton, DC. 
66 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Gouverneur K. Warren, Union military 
commander in the east, October 30, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 144; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 
27, 1861 - July 30, I 881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office 
ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archjves Building, Washington, DC. 
67 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Marsena R. Patrick, Provost Marshal General 
City Point, October 30, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 146; Teiegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 2 7, 1861 -
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informed General Patrick that the Secretary of War "expects from you cardul and exact 
impartiality toward the representatives of the two parties." Continuing, Dana declared 
"as the agents of Governor Seymour here and in Baltimore have been detected in the 
perpetration of gross frauds and forgeries for the purpose of causing the votes of soldiers 
to be counted in favor of Democratic candidates when those soldiers intended to vote 
against such candidates, he expects you to exercise vigilance for the detection of such 
crimes."68 Dana concluded: "should it finally appear that such wrongs. have been 
consummated when due watchfulness on your post might have prevented them, you will 
be held responsible for the same."69 
In the days preceding the election, Dan_a sent numerous dispatches trying to 
ascertain additional information to identify the possible fraudulent agents. He arranged 
to have Colonel Baker transport McCloskey to Washington City for further questioning. 
Despite John A. Marshall ' s harsh tone concerning these indiscriminate arrests~ Dana's 
orders were to follow only specific leads with no seizures. For example, on October 31 , 
Dana ordered Major General Benjamin Butler to look after two New York agents whom 
the War Department suspected "are engaged in such frauds as have recently been 
discovered here+ in Baltimore."70 It is possible that Dana intended this only as a 
July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the 
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warning that the War Department had suspidons that these two individuals were working 
to steal the election in favor of the Democratic candidates and that General Butler, a 
political general in the Union army, should not assist them. President Lincoln relieved 
General Butler of his command after the election, when it was politically acceptable. 
Strictly speaking, Marshall ' s criticism that Dana authorized the arrests of innocent 
individuals is entirely justified. With legal approval from the Judge Advocate General's 
office, Dana issued orders for the arrest of Colonel North, Major Cohn and Lieutenant 
Jones. A military commission tried and found them innocent, but President Lincoln did 
not authorize their release until January 1865.71 There are two aspects of Dana's 
involvement that are either different or absent from Marshall's and Joseph George Jr.'s 
account of this event. First, while Marshall asserts that Dana included the phrase "by the 
order of the President" to "screen himself from personal responsibility," in instances 
where Dana made arrests that higher authorities sanctioned, he included that in his 
dispatches. 72 
Second, in George' s description of Major Cohn's affidavit, three individuals were 
present in the room in addition to the defendant: Judge Advocate John A. Foster, 
President Lincoln, and Dana. 73 As President Lincoln conducted the interview with Major 
Cohn, and Judge Advocate Foster represented the executive's legal authority, their role in 
this meeting was clear; however, Dana' s presence was peculiar. Even Major Cohn did 
not recognize Dana, merely assuming that he was the stenographer.74 Dana, however, as 
the head of the federal organization responsible for quashing suspicious activities 
71 George, "The North Affair," 200. 
72 Marshall, American Bastille, 561 . 
73 George, "The North Affair," 212. 
74 George, ''The North Affair," 212 . 
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throughout the North, oversaw this investigation from the beginning. His presence 
indicated his desire to receive any additional information from individuals already in 
custody that could lead to the arrest of other undetected conspirators. While Marshall 
criticized the handling of this investigation, Dana's management ensured that the 
Democratic agents did not steal the election away from President Lincoln, assuring that 
he would have a second term to attempt to end the Civil War as a unified nation. 
One element of this investigation differed from others Dana oversaw. It was 
public. Usually, there was no press coverage. Only high profile cases captured the 
attention of local newspapers.75 However, the trial of Colonel North, Major Cohen, and 
Lieutenant Jones filled half of the front page of the Republican Chicago Tribune on 
November 5 ~ 1864.76 In the days leading up to the election, this story was a sensation 
with both the Democratic and Republican presses attempting to use it to their advantage. 
On November 7, in an effort to exonerate Colonel North, the Democratic New York 
Herald published a letter to the editor declaring that Lieutenant Jones' s initial statement 
condemning Colonel North was inconsistent with the one he later gave the paper' s 
reporter. 77 It further stated that when Lieutenant Jones attempted to explain his 
involvement with the soldiers who wanted to vote for Democratic candidates, 
government officials interrupted him and required that he stay at the "agency" for a 
75 One of the investigations Dana oversaw that received press coverage was Wtlliam B. Cozzens, a 
fraudulent contractor from Phiiadelphia. For more information, consult J. Matthew Gallman 's Mastering 
Wartime: A Social History or Philadelphia during the Civil War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990), 289-90. 
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couple of days. 78 Finally, it declared that Lieutenant Jones denied that Colonel North was 
involved with any of the fraudulent voting practices. 79 
Initially, the press ferociously followed this story, but the sensationalism quickly 
waned. On the Monday prior to the election, even the New York Herald devoted equal 
space to it and discussions concerning railroad fares. 8° Critics of Lincoln's 
administration, such as Marshall, would give a full and scathing account of this incident 
after the war, but following the election, the news quickly turned to election results and 
then Sherman ' s March to the Sea. 
Problems with the Press 
Following the election, issues arose surrounding the nation's press. In every war, 
a balance between providing pertment information to the public and the need to safeguard 
what could potentially compromise the safety and operations of the soldiers exists. The 
Civil War was no different. However, unlike later conflicts, there was relatively little 
censorship.81 Enforcing existing regulations became Dana' s responsibly. In 1862, 
Congress gave the War Department authority to supervise telegraph commumcations to 
thwart the transmission of military infmmation that the Secretary of War had not 
released. Congress granted this power to the Assistant Secretary of War and General 
Manager of Military Telegraphs.82 Although Dana never used the second title, it became 
his duty to monitor this communication. As one of the most prominent newspaper editors 
prior to the war, Dana favored the dissemination of information to newspapers 
78 Ablien, "The Case of Colonel North." 
79 Ablien, "The Case of Colonel North." 
80 
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throughout the country. However, in his current position, he needed to ensure that 
Northern newspapers only published authorized military information. 
The federal government had the right to prevent a newspaper from publishing 
information, especially if it proved too great a threat to the Union's cause.83 However, 
what this qualification included was subject to interpretation. The Secretary of War 
could arrest and imprison editors who printed insurrectionary pieces, classified 
information, and other stories that were harmful to the Union war effort.84 The War 
Department took the issue seriously and had no qualms enforcing it, even after the 
hostilities ceased. As a result, numerous Northern newspapers suffered under this 
suppression. 
One instance occurred roughly one week after President Lincoln's assassination. 
Dana received a report concerning the publication of an official telegraph from the 
Secretary of War in the American, a newspaper based in Baltimore, Maryland. The paper 
had printed a single telegram, as two separate dispatches and mislabeled the time 
stamps.85 While this may seem like a trivial error, and no evidence exists that the journal 
had an ulterior motive for manipulating the Secretary's dispatch, Dana informed the 
American's ed1tor: "any repetition of such an act will result in the withholding of future 
dispatches of the Secretary of War from the journal guilty of the same. "86 In response, 
83 Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, 492. 
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the newspaper editor apologized for their "typographical error" and declared that he split 
the dispatch "to give greater prominence" to the two distinct topics it covered.87 
Dana's conscientiousness for his duties and President Lincoln's suppression of 
civil liberties during the Civil War are evident from this example. First, even though 
Dana was a prominent newspaper editor before and after the war, he took his 
responsibilities extremely seriously. Breaches in established policy, even when they no 
longer affected the safety of Union soldiers, needed proper attention. Additionally, the 
trust Dana developed with the Secretary of War was key to their working relationship. 
Dana did not hesitate to perform his duty, even when it targeted members of his chosen 
profession, a radical dt:parture from his leak about his first appointment as Assistant 
Secretary of War two years earlier. The works of Marshall, J. G. Randall, and Mark E. 
Neely reveal disgust for the Lincoln administration's suppression of the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of American citizens. While journalists sometimes misrepresent facts 
or print faulty information, the First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press. In this 
case, the editor of the American only seemed to make a harmless typographical error. 
Finally, most of the works that examine the constitutionality and other legal 
aspects of the Civil War in the North focus on top-level officials who helped the 
President create and then execute legal procedures.88 Those in subordinate positions, 
such as Dana, were necessary and willing participants in these activities as well. While 
they did not formulate the policies, they did help execute them. In performing these 
87 Alex Fulton, Agt Asst P, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, April25, 1865; Vol. 
246, p. 126; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April i 5. 1861 - March 31, 1869 (National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 118); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record 
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88 Mark E. Neely, The Fate of Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 116. Neely ' s 
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duties, it is clear that the government suppressed activities that the Constitution protected, 
even if they posed no harm to the Union. Dana's involvement with this episode was 
ironic. Less than a decade later, members of President Ulysses S Grant's administration 
and others filed charges, which they later dismissed, against the New York Sun and Dana 
for libel. 89 
Arbitrary Arrests 
While many of the previous examples did not involve arrests, it was a major 
component of the investigative activities Dana supervised at the War Department. There 
is considerable debate concerning the actual number of civilians arbitrarily detained from 
February 1862 through the end of the war. While 13,535 is the traditionally accepted 
figure, Neely's study argues that is a conservative estimate.90 Dana oversaw and 
authorized many of these during his tenure in Washington City, deriving his legal 
authority from the Judge Advocate General and his subordinates in the Bureau of 
Military Justice, who briefed the President concerning court-martial cases.91 While some 
implicated only one or two individuals at a time, as in the case concerning voting fraud, 
others demonstrate that Dana planned and executed larger, multi-state raids. One 
instance occurred the Monday before election day 1864 and involved the generals in 
charge ofthe Northern areas east of the Mississippi River. 
While the War Department worried about attempts to influence the presidential 
election in favor of the Democratic peace candidate, their investigations uncovered 
89 Wilson, The Life ofCharles Anderson Dana, 432-33. 
90 Neely, The Fate of Liberty, 130. 
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dozens of Confederate agents throughout the North. Dana coordinated a massive raid to 
arrest these suspects the day before the election.92 It targeted eighteen Confederate 
agents located in most of the major cities across the United States from Boston, 
Massachusetts to Saint Louis, Missouri.93 After working with the Secretary of War, Dana 
released his orders to the Union generals in charge of the areas involved on Saturday, 
November 5.94 As a precaution, to prevent word from leaking to other Confederate 
agents, each general received a list of individuals to arrest at exactly 10:00 a.m. the 
following Monday.95 The result wao; staggering. Authorities captured all but one 
92 It is unknown whether these individuals were suspected of fraudulent voting practices similar to 
the one concerning the New York agents. However, the fact that their arrest occurred the Monday before 
the election in such a coordinated and methodical fashion :.uggests that the War Department suspected them 
of attempting to disrupt the reelection of President Lincoln. Addition~lly, as several of the individuals 
targeted in the raid were civilians, the War Department could have waited to arrest them arbitrari ly after the 
election to prevent any negative publicity associated with their detainment that could have jeopardized 
President Lincoln's :-edection. 
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suspect.96 It was the largest legal operation that Dana oversaw and demonstrated his 
active participation in the arbitrary arrests of civilians, the extensive nature of his 
organization, and the enormous resources at his disposal to prosecute those who, in the 
eyes of the Lincoln administration, were a threat to the Union war effort. However, there 
was little publicity considering the level of coordination needed for this raid, making it 
impossible to determine the charges each individual faced, with one exception. 
Prior to the election, the Confederates launched numerous attacks throughout the 
North. One of the most famous was the Saint Alban's Raid. At the same time, an 
incident occurred in Chicago, Illinois in which military authorities took an individual into 
custody with the same last name as a suspect on Dana's list. On Monday, November 7, 
1864, Colonel B. J. Sweet, the commandant ofthe port at Camp Douglas, arrested 
numerous Confederate guerilla forces trying to free prisoners of war housed there. In an 
attempt to frustrate election procedures the following day, their plan was to stuff the 
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96 George A. Cadwallader, Union commander Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Charles A. Dana, 
Assistant Secretary of War, November 6, 1864; Vol. 243, p. 75 ; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of 
War, Apri/15, 1861 - March 31 1869 (National Archives Microfilm PublicatiOn M473, ro11116); Records 
of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
72 
ballot boxes to ensure that the Democratic peace candidates carried the city.97 In an 
extended column, the Chicago Tribune stated that Colonei Sweet and his agents had been 
investigating these plotters under the command of Colonel Vincent Marmaduke, brother 
of the Confederate General John S. Marmaduke, for several days and detained them on 
November 7; the date Dana' s instructions specified.98 
Even though the article focused primarily on Colonel Marmaduke and the actual 
Confederate guerillas, the key individual re~ponsible for coordinating their activities was 
Back S. Morris, the Treasurer of the Son<; of Liberty and a retired Illinois circuit judge. 99 
Dana's telegram to General Joseph Hooker ordered the arrest of a Major Morris. 100 Upon 
Morris' s apprehension, the federal agents uncovered evidence ofhis involvement in a 
previous prisoner escape from Camp Douglas and the plans for a November 7 prison 
break. 101 With this information, Colonel Sweet and the military authorities were able to 
seize many of the Confederate agents located throughout Chicago and foil the plot. 102 
Major Morris' s arrest is the only detention linked to Dana's dispatches. News of it 
quickly spread throughout the North, appearing the fol1owing day in the New York 
Herald. 103 
As these arrests were very controversial during the war, there is little doubt that 
President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and Dana approved of the silence surrounding these 
97 
"The Rebel Raid: Its Magnitude - Designs of the Marauders- How they were Met and Coiled -
More 'Arbitrary ' Arrests - The Prisoners," Chicago Tribune, November 7, 1864. 
98 
"The Rebel Raid." 
99 
"The Rebel Raid." 
100 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Joseph Hooker, Union commander Cincinnati, 
Ohio, November 5, !864; Vol. 184, p. 213 ; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - Ju/y 
30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
101 
"The Rebel Raid." 
102 
"The Rebel Raid." 
103 
"Startling News from Chicago: Alleged Plot to Bum the City and Release the Rebel Prisoners 
at Camp Douglas," New York Herald, November 8, 1864. 
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raids. Dana's authorization for Morris's apprehension was only one of the eighteen 
Confederate agents targeted in the raid. The results, however, were tremendous, as it 
thwarted a Confederate prison break and a threat to sabotage the election. There was a 
very distinct possibility that the other sixteen individuals Dana' s agents arrested stopped 
similar plots. While Dana executed his duties fairly and firmly in his pursuit of justice, 
he fully employed the expanded authority of the War Department, allowing for the 
arbitrary arrest of the civilian population. Shoddy intelligence and human error 
contributed to the abuse of this authority. However, in this instance, it led to the 
incarceration of an active Confederate sympathizer and stopped a planned prisoner 
escape. 
Conclusion 
The degree to which Dana participated in legal activities varied. When dealing 
with issues concerning fraudulent contractors, his capable subordinates handled most of 
the details. Dana did not micromanage and limited his involvement. In other legal 
matters, he acted in a similar manner. While Falvin portrays Dana as a low-level official 
who merely made suggestions that Colonel Baker frequently ignored, this study found no 
record of Baker disregarding any of Dana' s directives. Dana limited his involvement 
until necessary, as he had in many other matters requiring his attention. 
Additionally, this examination reveals a less glamorous side to Dana's activities. 
During his tenure, he was a willing participant in the government's efforts to suppress 
civil liberties and arbitrarily arrest civilians. Scholars critical of the role President 
Lincoln and his Cabinet Secretaries played in these activities should also consider that 
those individuals who held positions similar to the Assistant Secretary of War deserve a 
share of the blame. While it is true that Dana, and the organization he oversaw, were 
essential to thwart the efforts of fraudulent contractors as well as those who seriously 
intended to harm the Union war effort, it is equally true that the enormous authority the 
federal government wielded during the war led to some government abuse. 
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Did Dana arrest Colonel North, Major Cohn, and Lieutenant Jones knowing they 
were innocent? Did he attempt to conceal Colonel Brown's shady business deals? 
Historians may never know the answer to these and many other questions concerning the 
intent and extent of the abuse of government authority during the Civil War. However, 
the evidence indicates that Dana dealt with offenders in a fair manner and did not exploit 
his authority. Before criticizing his handling ofthe diverse and complex nature of these 
cases and his supervision of the Agents ofthe War Department, one must also understand 
the enormity of his other duties. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RECONDITE AND UNREMITTING DUTIES 
While Chapter III reveals Charles Dana's importance managing the activities of 
the Agents of the War Department, there was another vital aspect of his tenure as 
Assistant Secretary of War and a key to Union victory. Beginning with his effort to 
secure soldiers' furloughs for the 1864 presidential election, this chapter explores Dana' s 
responsibilities representing the more recondite functions of the War Department. 
Among these were handling prisoners, transporting soldiers, procuring supplies, and 
managing issues involving federal policies such as the Emancipation Proclamation. 
While Dana worked in Washington City a mere eleven months, he proved an 
indispensable administrator for many of the department's obscure, but necessary 
functions. His ability to oversee these diverse and demanding tasks accentuates his most 
important contributions to the war effort and underscores the error of gauging his 
significance simply by his interactions with General Grant. 
Many of Dana' s duties occurred within the purview ofthe Quartermaster Corps, 
the domain of logistics, a frequently overlooked necessity for combat operations. 
Nevertheless, this division experienced dramatic changes once hostilities erupted and 
Stanton became Secretary of War. From the ancient Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, 
through the Napoleonic era, to the maxims of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri 
Jomini, few commanders and military theorists offer meaningful recommendations to 
understand its importance. 1 Dana's contributions to this realm are no different. 
1 Sun Tzu, The ll/ustrated Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 215, 107; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 131 ; Antoine Henri Jomini, "Art of War," in Roots of 
Strategy: Book 2, ed. Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 450. 
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The Quartermaster Corps was responsible for ensuring that the troops received a 
continuous supply of essential equipment and transportation. While supplying isolated 
frontier outposts presented its own unique challenges, this branch of the War Department 
was woefully ill-prepared for the demands of the rapidly expanding Union army. At the 
war's outbreak, it consisted of thirty-five officers with a string of Quartermaster 
Generals.2 The first, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston, resigned upon Virginia' s 
secession and joined the Confederate army.3 Simon Cameron, Stanton' s predecessor, 
replaced Johnston with Montgomery C. Meigs, who aggressively expanded it.4 Meigs 
not only supplied the fielded forces, he and his division oversaw other functions, 
including helping Stanton prosecute fraud. Consequently, Meigs became an important 
member of the revitalized War Department. Due to insufficient time and the plethora of 
functions of the Quartermaster Corps, Stanton delegated the routine coordination between 
it and the War Department to subordinate civilian administrators, such as Assistant 
Secretary of War Dana. 
While Meigs had many responsibilities, during Dana' s tenure he became involved 
with three areas of the Quartermaster Corps: clothing and equipping the Union army, 
arranging land and sea transportation, and providing regular supplies to federal forces. 
Prior to Fort Sumter, the Quartermaster Corps had one designated bureau. 5 By the time 
Dana arrived, Meigs had created the bureaucratic apparatus, which would exist for the 
2 Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 334. 
3 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 333-34. 
4 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 337; Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of 
the Union Army: A Biography ofM C. Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 213 . Weigley 
argues that Meigs developed a close and cooperative relationship with the Secretary of War, which assisted 
the Quartermaster Corps in performing its duties. 
5 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 337. 
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remainder of the war.6 Similar to Stanton's revamped War Department, Meigs had 
organized the Quartermaster Corps to function efficiently, permitting Dana and others to 
perform their duties. However, this division presented Dana with its own unique 
challenges. 
Election Furloughs 
The Quartermaster Corps and Dana often worked together to manage the North's 
massive transportation network. Over this system, a constant supply of sustenance and 
material traveled to the various Union forces, in addition to military servicemen and 
government officials. Dana was particularly involved with the latter, especially as it 
related to furloughs for the 1864 Presidential Election. While investigating fraudulent 
voting practices in October and early November of 1864, he simultaneously arranged for 
thousands of leaves for Union soldiers to return home to cast their ballots. As he 
recalled, "we were busy in the department arranging for soldiers to go home to vote, and 
also for taking of ballots in the army. There was a constant succession of telegrams from 
all parts of the country requesting that leave of absence be extended to this or that officer, 
in order that his district at home might have the benefit of his vote and political 
influence."7 Even though most states passed laws permitting their soldiers to vote in the 
field, five had not.8 While the War Department actively sought to furlough these 
soldiers, Stanton's primary concern was to ensure that the Union army maintained 
adequate numbers at the front to counter attacks and maintain pressure on the 
6 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 337. The last major addition to the Quartermaster 
Corps was Colonel Charles Thomas to handle fraudulent cases in 1864. 
7 Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War: With the Leaders at Washington and in the 
Field in the Sixties (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1913), 260. 
8 John C. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln: The Battle for the 1864 Presidency (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1997), 340. The five states yet to permit some form of absentee voting included: Indiana, 
Illinois, Delaware, New Jersey, and Oregon. 
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Confederates. Judiciously, Dana had to decide if it was prudent to grant certain leaves or 
if it would jeopardize the Union's frontline. An incorrect decision could prove 
disastrous. Therefore, he was selective in those he granted. In his Recollections, Dana 
recalled, "All the power and influence of the War Department, then something enormous 
from the vast expenditure and extensive relations ofthe war, was employed to secure the 
re-election of Mr. Lincoln."9 
In Illinois, Republican Governor Richard Yates sought Dana's assistance for the 
return of as many soldiers as possible. Yates's persistence and variety of demands 
provide an example to explore this facet of Dana's role in Lincoln's administration as 
well as his importance to the broader war effort .. Requests flooded the War Department, 
but the only guaranteed furloughs that Dana could authorize were for soldiers 
hospitalized for sickness and combat injuries, unable to report for regular duty, but stable 
enough to travel home because their absence would not affect the Union' s military 
strength. Approximately one month prior to the election, Yates requested permission for 
his state' s agents to visit hospitals treating Illinois soldiers. They were to compile the 
names of those eligible for furloughs so that he could secure their return home. Replying 
to one of Dana' s requests for information, Yates declared that he had "appointed agents 
to procure lists of sick+ wounded [Illinois soldiers] in the field+ general Hospitals."10 
However, there was a problem. General William T. Sherman prohibited nonmilitary 
personnel to proceed south ofNashville, Tennessee. Yates, fearful ofbeing unable to 
obtain expedient approval for these hospitalized soldiers, urged Dana "to issue orders to 
9 Dana, Recollections, 261. 
10 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
13, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 66; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, /869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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all Medical Directors to furlough all sick + wounded Illinoisans + send them home at 
once."
11 If administrators at Union army hospitals directly granted the furloughs, Yates 
hoped to expedite the homecoming of these troops. Within three weeks, he again relayed 
this persistent undertone ofurgency as well his perception ofthe vital nature of the 
Illinois soldiers' vote for a successful National Union Party election. 12 
There is no known response to this request, but Dana did ask Yates to provide 
"the names of the three agents you wish to send to Atlanta." 13 Upon obtaining an answer, 
Dana sent messages to each individual authorizing them to visit "all the hospitals and 
camps in the Military Division of the Mississippi" and that "All Military officers are 
hereby directed to give you every facility for the performance of your duty." 14 Given the 
War Department's painstaking efforts to secure every possible ballot, it is quite probable 
that Dana or Stanton gave this order. 15 In addition, four days earlier, Dana received a 
telegram from Alex Underwood, in York, Pennsylvania, but an active member ofthe 
11 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
13, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 66; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861- March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
12 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
25, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 339; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861- March 31, /869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
The National Union Party was a political conception that President Lincoln devised in order to 
secure his reelection. As the North still contained a large number of influential democrats, the National 
Union Party would bridge the gap between Democrats and Republicans, in order for Lincoln to get enough 
Democratic support to win a second term. 
13 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, October 8, 
1864; Vol. 183, p. 365; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record 
Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
14 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to George Lee, Illinois State Official, October 16, 
1864; Vol. 183, p. 487; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record 
Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
15 As this was such a broad order applicable to medical units throughout the Union army, it is 
likely that Stanton would have issued the order himself. From the telegrams this study examined, Stanton 
bestowed Dana with the authority to handle specific cases; however, when it came to major policy 
decisions Stanton issued those orders personally. 
80 
Republican Party in New York City. Underwood stated his concern that the "Surgeon in 
charge of [the] Hospital here says no order to furlough soldiers for the election has been 
received. Surg Genl Barnes telegraphed no such order has been received." 16 Clearly all 
Union soldiers were now the focus of Dana' s authorized furloughs, not only the sick and 
injured Illinois men. 
In New York, Dana's communication with Ben Field, a prominent coordinator of 
the state' s Republican Party, provides additional compelling evidence of Dana' s role in 
securing these furloughs. Field inquired "if and when" the War Department would issue 
an all-encompassing order "granting leave to soldiers in hospitals to go home to 
election." 17 Considering the historical precedent of this state's propensity to vote for 
Democratic candidates, the New York Draft riots of 1863, and the discovery of fraud 
initiated by the state's governor, Field, like Yates, clearly wanted to ensure that as many 
soldiers as possible participated in the election. 18 The cumulative effect of these 
concerns, in cooperation with the Secretary of War, led to Dana's quick response: "A 
general order will be issued. I think from Nov. 4th to 11 th." 19 
Field and Underwood' s telegrams are very revealing. While these furloughs 
preoccupied the War Department prior to the election, there was no all-encompassing 
16 Alex Underwood to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary ofWar, October 3, 1864; Vol. 241 , p. 
401; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861- March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, roll 115); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
17 Ben Field to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 26, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 347; 
Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
18 The votes that soldiers cast in person would not be affected by the current scheme of voter fraud 
by the governor, which focused on the "stealing" of absentee votes. 
· 
19 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Ben Field, October 26, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 87; 
Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861- July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M473 , roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National 
Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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policy or general order regarding soldiers unfit for regular service. Without it, Dana had 
to consider each request individually, an onerous process, as it required the names of each 
soldier as well as his unit and location. Furthermore, to compile this information, every 
state had to appoint special commissioners to visit every Union camp and hospital that 
housed their soldiers. These officials also needed special permission to travel through 
Union occupied territory to reach their troops. To complicate matters, for part of 
October, Stanton was away from Washington City. Telegrams during this period reveal 
that Dana was the acting Secretary of War, thus giving him many additional 
responsibilities. 20 
Throughout this stressful period, Dana always exhibited an understanding of the 
War Department's priorities. While votes were important, he could not compromise the 
military's primary mission: winning the war. The situation was rarely unequivocal, and 
Dana exerted considerable energy trying to accommodate as many requests as possible. 
For example, Yates realized that some Illinois soldiers had furloughs that expired 
between October 14 and November 8 (Election Day), excluding them from voting. 
Appealing to the War Depmtment, Yates urged Dana to "issue [an] order for [an] 
extension of all furloughs to cover that time," pleading that this action "would save 
hundreds ofvotes."21 Originally, Dana refused, replying, "Pressing military necessity" 
required that "Every soldier is imperatively needed at the front."22 However, upon 
20 Dana's telegrams from October 15-18 show his signature as acting Secretary of War. 
21 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
14, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 66; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861- March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
22 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, October 
14, 1864; Vol. 183, p. 472; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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reconsideration, Dana sent Yates a second telegram requesting the names and units of the 
soldiers in question.23 The governor, however, was unable to comply, as he only 
possessed the number of Illinois soldiers, two to three thousand, serving along the 
Mississippi River or with Sherman's army in Atlanta.24 Instead, Yates pleaded for a 
"general order extending furloughs."25 While it is unknown whether these soldiers 
received their furloughs in time to return home before the election, the fact that President 
Lincoln carried Illinois by only twenty thousand ballots reveals the importance of each 
vote in determining the division of the state's electoral votes?6 
Dana's involvement also helps to convey the governor's sense of urgency. In the 
early evening of October 21 , Yates sent a brief t~legram to Dana with the unorthodox 
request to order Major General William S. Rosecrans "to furlough all paroled prisoners 
belonging to Illinois Regiments in the Department until after the election."27 While there 
is no known reply, it illustrates the constant pressure that politicians and party organizers 
23 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, October 
15, 1864; Vol. 183, p. 473; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861-July 30, 188 1 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
Even though there is no record of further discussions on this matter, it is possible that Dana 
consulted with the Secretary of War and then arranged for any extension that Stanton believed would not 
hinder the war effort. It is important to remember that General William T. Sherman needed the full 
strength of his army for his March to the Sea after the election and his army included many Illinois soldiers. 
24 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
18, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 152; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
25 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
18, 1864; Vol. 242, p. 152; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
This study found no telegram responding to Yates' request; however, considering the time it took 
for Stanton to issue a general order concerning hospitalized troops and his need to balance soldier furloughs 
against combat strength, it is possible that Dana and Stanton merely ignored this appeal. 
26 John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, " Election of 1864," American Presidency Project, accessed 
May 2, 20 13, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year= 1864. 
27 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
21 , 1864; Vol. 242, p. 252; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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placed on the War Department and Dana in particular. It also shows the tremendous 
effort and contributions that low-level officials gave to the President's reelection. 
Without Dana's attempts to secure furloughs for soldiers from the five states lacking 
absentee voting, there was a possibility that President Lincoln could lose them to George 
B. McClellan and Democratic Congressional candidates who advocated a negotiated 
peace.28 Due in large part to Dana' s work, this did not occur. If President Lincoln had 
lost the election and been unable to defeat the Confederacy, Dana's efforts would have 
proved fruitless . His involvement also represented the expanded role of the federal 
government in elections, since the War Department oversaw not only absentee voting and 
furloughing soldiers, but also prosecuting those who threatened these efforts.29 Finally, 
Yates' s request reveals that one of Dana's additional responsibilities concerned the 
nation's wartime prison population. 
Prisoners 
During the war, the federal government detained three types of prisoners. The 
first included prisoners ofwar, uniformed Confederate combatants captured as 
capitulators, deserters, or through other circumstances. Dana' s contact with them 
demonstrates the breadth of his duties with the War Department. For most of these 
inquiries, Dana merely acted as Stanton's assistant, relaying the Secretary's opinion 
based on previous cases. For example, Colonel William Hoffman, Commissary-General 
of Prisoners at Fort Monroe, Virginia, requested clarification of instructions concerning 
"the delivery of artificial limbs to prisoners of war" and whether he had authorization "to 
28 Jonathan W. White, "Canvassing the Troops: The Federal Government and the Soldiers' Right 
to Vote," Civil War Hist01y 50, no. 3 (September 2004): 312. 
29 White, "Canvassing the Troops," 317. 
84 
furnish limbs ... to cover all such applications."30 Per the Secretary' s policy, Dana 
responded that "By order of the Secretary of War" Colonel Hoffman could issue the 
prosthetic limbs in all similar cases.31 To give his response added credibility, Dana 
enclosed Stanton' s original order issued four months prior that he had "no objections to 
Messers. Palmer & Co. furnishing wooden legs to the rebels that need them. "32 
For the second and third categories of prisoners, Dana's responsibilities expanded 
beyond relaying established protocol. These detainees included those tried and convicted 
by a general court-martial as well as civilians accused of treasonous acts and held under 
the jurisdiction of the War Department. While chapter two examined Dana's role in 
these investigations, once convicted, the department became responsible for holding these 
individuals. Therefore, Dana needed to find adequate facilities for them during their 
sentence or until they no longer posed a threat to the Union war effort, no small task. 
Although prisons were scattered throughout the North and additional camps constantly 
opened, Dana realized that the need was greater than the existing accommodations, 
forcing him to maximize the available space in established facilities. 33 
To this end, Dana contacted a variety ofNorthern institutions to ascertain their 
capacity, a practice that would continue after the war. The commander at Fort Delaware, 
Albin F. Schoeph, telegraphed Dana, "Owing to the heavy influx of prisoner of Courts 
30 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, 2"d ser., 7 (Washington, DC), 68. 
31 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, 2"d ser., 7 (Washington, DC), 69. 
32 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, 2"d ser., 7 (Washington, DC), 69. 
33 William B. Hesseltine, "Civil War Prisons: Introduction," Civil War History 8, no. 2 (June 
1962): 118. 
The accepted figure for the number of Confederates held as prisoner of war in the North is 
2 14,865. However, this number does not include the second and third categories of prisoners held under 
the jurisdiction of the War Department. As there is no commonly accepted figure for the number of these 
types of prisoners held during the war, it is possible that the total number of prisoners that the War 
Department, and, therefore, in part, Dana managed exceeded 220,000. 
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Martial I was compelled to increase the room for them and therefore filled up casemates 
which enables me to accommodate eighty more."34 In May 1865, Dana contacted John 
Foss, the warden of the New Hampshire State Prison in Concord, addressing the 
feasibility of accepting prisoners "under sentence of Courts Martial on terms agreed upon 
in our conversation some months since."35 With Governor Joseph A. Gilmore's 
approval, Foss replied that they were able to "receive fifty prisoners upon the order of the 
War Dep[artment] immediately. Will take them on the terms agreed upon in our 
conversation."36 While Dana negotiated with various state-run prisons, on February 12, 
1865, he also telegraphed Major General Edward 0. C. Ord, Commander of the Army of 
the James, at Bermuda Hundred, Virginia, requesting the number of "insane persons" at 
the Williamsburg Asylum.37 
Dana's dealings with prisoners not only concerned their confinement, but also 
their transportation. For example, after Stanton's review of Warden John Parkhurst's 
application to commit federal detainees at his facility, Dana arranged for their transfer to 
Clinton Prison in Dannemora, New York, in the northern part of the state.38 He informed 
34 Albin F. Schoeph, Commander of Fort Delaware, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, May 21, 1865; Vol. 247, p. 133; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April/5, 1861- March 
31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 118); Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
35 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John Foss, Warden New Hampshire State 
Prison, May 19, 1865; Vol. 187, p. 428; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 2 7, 1861 - July 30, 
1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 89); Records of the Office ofthe Secretary of 
War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
36 John Foss, Warden New Hampshire State Prison, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, May 19, 1865; Vol. 247, p. 44; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, /861 - March 
31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M4 73, roll 118); Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
37 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Edward Ord, Commander of the Army of the 
James, February 12, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 271 ; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, /861 - July 
30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
38 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John Parkhurst, Warden Clinton Prison, August 
30, 1864; Vol. 182, p. 367; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April27, 1861-July 30, 1881 
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Parkhurst, "The first installment not over fifteen or twenty in number may be expected 
within ten days."39 Similarly, in November, Dana made arrangements with the Assistant 
Adjutant General at City Point, Virginia, Colonel J. H. Taylor, to receive five prisoners 
from the Army of Potomac at Petersburg.40 
When Dana handled issues directly affecting the detainees, such as the 
distribution of prosthetic limbs, or their transfers, his correspondence contains a phrase 
relating to an order by the Secretary of War. In these instances, Dana acted as a 
functionary for Stanton. For prisoner movements, such as those with Foss and Colonel 
Taylor, this phrase did not appear. In these cases, Dana, as the most senior civilian, had 
the authority of the War Department and Stanton' s implicit trust to perform these duties. 
Broader implications of Dana's role exist regarding the North's prison population, 
especially for captured Confederates. Many studies criticize, albeit justifiably, Lincoln's 
administration and the War Department for its treatment of those detained. William B. 
Hesseltine, a pioneering scholar on Civil War prisons, admits that both sides treated their 
prison populations more severely than was necessary to keep them secure.41 For 
example, the Secretary of War ordered the reduction of supplies and sustenance to rebel 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll86); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
39 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John Parkhurst, Warden Clinton Prison, August 
30. 1864; Vol. 182, p. 367; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 86); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
4° Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Colonel J. H. Taylor, November I I, 1864; Vol. 
184, p. 264; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (Narional Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC; Colonel J. H. Taylor to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, November II , 1864; Vol. 243, p. 160; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 
- March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfi lm Publication M473, roll 116); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
41 Hesseltine, "Civil War Prisons," 119. 
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prisoners to replicate the conditions of Union war prisoners in the South.42 Since Dana 
bore the responsibility for conveying Stanton's decisions for prosthetic limbs and 
arranging to maximize the capacity of Northern prison facilities, he was also culpable for 
their consequences, as it was impossible for Stanton to enforce his policy decisions 
without the diligence and support of valued subordinates such as Dana.43 
Transportation 
Just as Dana's work was necessary for the War Department to manage the transfer 
of the Union's large prisoner population, it was also vital for personnel movements. 
Numerous studies reveal the effects that the Northern railroad network had on the federal 
war effort and the corresponding influence the conflict had on the development of that 
42 Hesseltine, "Civil War Prisons," 118-19. Even with these measures, the mortality rate of 
Southern prisoners was 12 percent opposed to the 15.5 percent Union prisoners experienced. 
There have been two trends in the historiography of Civil War prisons. The first involves studies 
that examine individual prisons. The most popular of these Northern prisons for these studies has been 
Elmira, most likely because it had the highest fatality rate of any Union prison facility. Such works include 
Michael Herigen's Elmira: Death Camp of the North (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002). The 
entire June 1962 issue of Civil War History contains many other similar examinations. Additional studies 
of Elmira that examine the government contracting with this prison include Michael P. Gray' s two works: 
"Elmira, a City on a Prison-Camp Contract," Civil War History 45, no. 4 (December 1999): 322-338 and 
The Business of Captivity: Elmira and Its Civil War Prisons (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 200 I). 
The second trend examines the administrative activities and policies of these facilities. Charles W. 
Sanders Jr.'s work While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 2 breaks away from an apologetic view of the Confederate and 
Union prisoner of war camps and argues that the mistreatment of those in captivity was avoidable, and the 
federal government enacted policies that deliberately compounded the misery of these prisoners. However, 
Sanders does not examine the importance of mid level officials, such as Dana, who were responsible for 
enforcing and relaying these destructive policies. 
43 Even though this study found no correspondence of Dana's active participation in these affairs, 
the previous examples reveal that he was a point of contact within the War Department concerning policy 
decisions for civilian and military officials in charge of the prison facilities. As the Secretary of War's 
general orders concerning the treatment of Confederate prisoners constituted the War Department's policy 
and Dana made arrangements for the internment of these individuals beyond the normal capacity of these 
fac ilities, he also bears responsibility for the negative repercussions of these actions. However, this does 
not imply that he bears sole responsibility for the treatment of Confederate prisoners of war and civi lians 
the War Department incarcerated. From the correspondence examined for this study, Dana did not direct 
the activities of the Northern prison system, and, therefore, does not merit the same culpability for the 
deplorable conditions concerning their internment as he does for the arbitrary arrests of civilians examined 
in the previous chapter. 
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system after the war.44 However, these accounts underplay a crucial component that 
accompanied these movements: complexity. The development of the nation's railroads 
prior to the Civil War was not conducive for long distance travel. Numerous smaller 
railroads existed catering to local transportation needs.45 The Civil War fundamentally 
altered this perception.46 Studies that grasp this element have almost exclusively focused 
on the transportation of approximately twenty thousand troops from the east coast to 
Chattanooga in the summer of 1863 following the Union's defeat at the Battle of 
Chickamauga.47 However, massive transfers, as well as smaller ones, required a great 
deal of coordination. 
For these movements to flow smoothlx, constant communication between the War 
Department, the Quartermaster Corps, and the civilian railroad presidents and supervisors 
was crucial. The extent of the War Department's responsibilities during this time was so 
broad that Secretary Stanton could not oversee it personally. Therefore, he needed 
trusted subordinates, such as Dana, to supervise them. Dana's involvement in two 
44 There are several different trends to the historiography of Civil War Railroads. As the 
American Civil War constitutes the first major war in which both sides employed railroads, many studies 
focus on questions concerning the role of the railroad in Union victory and how the Civil War affected the 
technological development of the American rail system after the war. For those studies that deal with the 
railroads in the North consult Thomas Weber's The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, /86/-/865 (New 
York: King's Crown, 1952), George Edgar Turner's Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the 
Railroads in the Civil War (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1953) and John Elwood Clark's Railroads in 
the Civil War: Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 200 I). 
There are also many smaller studies that examine the role of the railroads in specific operations. 
The entire September 1961 issue of Civil War History contains many of these smaller examinations, but 
they also look at the role of the railroad in the success or failure of an operation or the railroad's legacy. 
However, other studies attempt to draw broader conclusions from the use of railroads. For example, 
William G. Thomas's The Iron War: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern America (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011) connects diverging perspectives between the North and the South 
concerninf the railroads to unique military, social, and political meaning. 
4 Weber, The Northern Railroads, 13. 
46 Weber, The Northern Railroads, 14. 
47 Clark's Railroads in the Civil War, Turner's Victory Rode the Rails, and Weber's The Northern 
Railroads all put emphasis on these larger movements. However, Clark's work constitutes a case study of 
the transportation of troops from the east coast to Chattanooga in 1863 and provides the best analysis for 
the degree of communication and coordination required for these successful logistical feats. 
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movements reveals four aspects of the Northern transportation system in the Civil War. 
First, the great intricacy involved in coordinating the policies and activities between the 
War Department, the railroads, and the Quartermaster Corps. The complexity existed 
whether the relocation involved one thousand five hundred or twenty thousand personnel. 
Second, these transfers demonstrated the system' s flexibility. Third, the War Department 
needed a competent, firm, and astute civilian official to oversee and handle any problems 
that might arise. Fourth, while Dana was in Washington he was this authority, and it 
became a significant part of his contribution to the Union war effort. 
To move the necessary materials and people, the Quartermaster Corps worked 
with civilian railroad companies that owned vast resources throughout the North. In 
order to understand this process, one must envision the chaotic nature of these competing 
railroad companies. One major provider was John W. Garrett's Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad. Originally, a Confederate sympathizer, Garrett saw the potential to reap 
enormous wartime profits and decided to work with the Union.48 In this way, he acquired 
tremendous revenue providing transportation for the Quartermaster Corps. To do this, he 
fought off the federal government' s attempts to control his private enterprise as Stanton 
had done at Chattanooga.49 Although the Quartermaster Corps frequently dealt with 
railroad company presidents and members of their board of directors, major problems 
would arise requiring the attention of high-ranking civilian officials in the War 
Department. Such a situation arose in Dana's first months in Washington . 
• 
48 Clark, Railroads in the Civil War, 32; Weber, The Northern Railroads, 28-29. Weber declares 
that Garrett had two loyalties. The first was to his railroad and this loyalty dictated his second loyalty to the 
Union. 
49 Clark, Railroads in the Civil War, 32-33. 
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The transfer of fifteen hundred prisoners from Elmira, New York occurred in 
October 1864. Garrett was adamant that his competitor the Northern Central Railway not 
get this contract. 50 He argued that sending cars "to the Northern Central will cause delays 
that may prove injurious," and recommended that the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, 
which used the same "standard" gauge as the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, supply the 
quartermaster at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania with suitable cars, "thus saving much delay in 
placing the cars at Elmira."51 Anticipating Dana's positive response, Garrett began 
coordinating with the Pennsylvania Central Railroad. The following day, however, John 
D. Cameron, President of the Northern Central Railway, replied that he "can carry the 
prisoners from Elmira in troop cars but cannot furnish passenger cars" and requested that 
Dana relay this message to the quartermaster in charge. 52 Seeking to facilitate this matter 
quickly and to Garrett's detriment, Dana responded to Cameron that he had already 
contacted the officer in charge of the move ordering him "to put the prisoners on such 
cars as you are able to furnish. "53 
The importance of Dana' s involvement in this issue is twofold. First, it 
demonstrates the intense competition between the Northern railroads vying for lucrative 
50 Analyses that examine the Union war effort throughout the conflict agree that the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad was one of the major railroads that transported men and material throughout the war. Unlike 
the South, however, the North had multiple rail lines traveling from the Ohio River to the major cities on 
the east coast. The Northern Central Railway was a major competitor with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 
51 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, October 4, 1864; Vol. 241 , p. 418 ; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 115); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC; Clark, Railroads in 
the Civil War, 16. 
52 John D. Cameron, President Northern Central Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, October 5, 1864; Vol. 24 1, p. 439; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 5); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
53 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John D. Cameron, President Northern Central 
Railroad, October 5, 1864; Vol. 183, p. 336; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861- July 
30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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War Department business. In this case, he was able to anticipate problems and make 
adjustments even before the railroad presidents. His foresight ensured the uninterrupted 
travel of government personnel throughout his tenure, while transcending inter-railroad 
squabbling. Second, changing the type of car used in this move was a violation of the 
railroad's contract with the department, which could result in financial and legal 
consequences for the Northern Central Railroad. Therefore, Cameron needed Dana' s 
approval before making the change. Expecting.this, Dana revised the contractual terms 
before Cameron made his formal request. While this incident was a relatively minor 
glitch compared to the massive transfer of soldiers in January 1865, it reveals that even 
small personnel movements required continuous communication and coordination with 
the War Department. 
At the end 1864, the Union war effort focused on the Eastern Theatre. General 
Sherman's march through Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah was complete, allowing him 
to drive north through the Carolinas to join the Army of the Potomac stalled in front of 
the important rail junction of Petersburg, Virginia. However, not all of the commanders 
who accompanied Sherman to Atlanta participated in the March to Sea. After the city' s 
fall, Sherman ordered Colonel John M. Schofield into Tennessee under the command of 
Major General George H. Thomas and the Army ofthe Cumberland. There, they 
defeated Confederate General John Bell Hood and the Army of Tennessee at the Battles 
of Franklin and Nashville in November and December 1864 respectively. 54 In February 
1865, in the Union's attempt to seize Richmond and destroy Robert E. Lee's Army of 
Northern Virginia, General Grant ordered now Brigadier General Schofield east to seize 
54 James M. McPherson and James K. Hogue, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
41h ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 20 I 0), 500-503. 
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Wilmington and command the Department ofNorth Carolina. The Quartermaster Corps 
was responsible for moving General Schofield 's troops from the Western Theater to the 
eastern seaboard to board military transports south. The relocation oftroops from 
Mississippi to North Carolina became the largest and most arduous transfer of troops that 
Dana oversaw, revealing the complexity of troop movements, the necessity of senior 
civilian officials to oversee them, and the significance ofthis aspect of his duties to the 
Union war effort. 
In October 1861, General Meigs appointed Robert Allen, later promoted to Brevet 
Major General, the Chief Quartermaster ofthe Department of Missouri and eventually 
the Mississippi Valley. 55 To assist him, General Allen ordered Colonel William Myers 
and Colonel Lewis B. Parsons to manage all rail and river transportation. 56 On January 
12, 1865, Dana informed General Allen and General Thomas that Colonel Parsons would 
"take general direction of the transportation of Gen. Schofield's corps from the 
Tennessee to Chesapeake Bay."57 The initial plan appeared relatively simple. Dana 
ordered that the "movement will be made as far as possible by boats from Eastport. If the 
state of navigation will allow the troops will not be debarked till they reach Parkersburg 
[West Virginia], but if necessary they wi ll take the rail either at Cairo, Evansville, 
55 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 427. 
56 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 427-28. 
57 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Robert Allen, Chief Quartermaster ofthe 
Department of Missouri, January 12, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 89; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 
27, 1861 - July 30, ;881 (Nat ional Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records of the Office 
of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; Nat ional Archives Building, Washington, DC; Charles A. 
Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to George H. Thomas, Commander of the Army of the Cumberland, 
January II , 1865; Vol. 185, p. 84; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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Jeffersonville or Cincinnati."58 From any of these locations, they could then take the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to the eastern seaboard. To simplify matters, Dana stipulated 
that these soldiers would leave their "transportation behind," referring to the unit' s 
livestock, thus Colonel Parsons only needed to arrange for the unit's personnel and 
artillery batteries. 59 
The soldiers of Schofield's new command came from units scattered throughout 
Union-occupied Mississippi and Tennessee near the Tennessee River. The first group of 
soldiers assembled in Eastport, Mississippi on January 14, 1865. Parsons arranged for a 
convoy of naval wartime vessels, including an ironclad, and steamboats to rendezvous at 
Paducah, Kentucky.6° From there, the convoy departed early on the morning of January 
17 and arrived in Eastport late that evening, where it met "the entire 2nd Division and two 
Brigades of the 3rd," totaling some nine thousand soldiers.61 Departing for Clifton, 
Tennessee to procure the remainder of General Schofield's Corps, the convoy began its 
58 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Robert Allen, Chief Quartermaster ofthe 
Department of Missouri, January 12, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 89; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 
27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records ofthe Office 
of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
59 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Robert Allen, Chief Quartermaster ofthe 
Department of Missouri, January 12, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 89; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 
27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records ofthe Office 
of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC; Charles A. 
Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, January 15, 1865; 
Vol. 185, p. 103; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April27, /861 - July 30, 188/ (National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 88); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record 
Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
60 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 17, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 110; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, Apri/ 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 117); Records ofthe Office ofthe 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
61 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 18, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 11 5; Telegrams Received bytheSecretaryofWar, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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journey north along the Tennessee River to Paducah.62 It then traveled east along the 
Ohio River towards Parkersburg and Wheeling, West Virginia with a scheduled arrival 
time of five to six days based on the river leve1.63 Passage from northern Mississippi to 
Alexandria, Virginia required smooth sailing and then rail transportation on the Baltimore 
& Ohio Railroad from Parkersburg or Wheeling.64 
On January 20, the convoy arrived in Louisville, Kentucky. Favorable weather 
conditions provided a speedy journey, but the temperature suddenly plummeted and ice 
began to form on the Ohio River.65 Although the convoy was in no immediate danger, 
Colonel Parsons declared, "All well advised boatsmen agree that it would be entirely 
unsafe attempting to go above Cincinnati until a change of weather for several days hence 
62 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 14, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 94; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, Apri/ 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
63 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 14, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 94; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office ofthe 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07 ; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
64 Lewi5 B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 14, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 94; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 7); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
Determining the course of travel that Parsons recommended required locating the proper state and 
location for Clifton and Eastport, as Parsons did not specify the state in his origmal telegrams. To do this, 
this study used the estimated transportation times and the times and locations for the various dispatches that 
Parsons sent throughout this process to create the only realistic path of travel. The only two other possible 
courses would have been for the convoy to pick up the soldiers at Clifton, TN and then continue south to 
Eastport, MS and then carry all the troops north or to split the convoy at Clifton, transporting those soldiers 
north while the rest of the convoy headed south to Eastport. However, as Parsons secured the protection of 
an ironclad, it is highly unlikely that he would have split up the convoy, weakening its defensive potential. 
The War Department frequently used the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad because it managed the only 
rail line to Washington, DC. Even though this railroad had been constantly harassed throughout the war' s 
early stages because of its close proximity to the Confederate regulars and guerillas, at th is point, it was 
secure and the War Department frequently relied on it for transportation to and from the capital. For more 
information concerning the securing of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad consult: Weber's The Northern 
Railroads, Thomas's The Iron Way, and Festus P. Summers' s ·'The Baltimore and Ohio-First in War," Civil 
War History 7, no. 3 (September 1961 ): 239-254. 
65 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 20, 1865; Vol. 244, p. I 32; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 7); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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on consultation with Genl Schofield and Genl Allen have ordered transportation by rail 
from Cincinnati."66 Dana informed General Allen that Cincinnati, Ohio, was an 
acceptable secondary location for the troops to disembark and board trains for the 
remainder of the trip. He also relayed Colonel Parson's message to Garrett to ensure that 
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was ready for the troops.67 However, this did not happen. 
The first sign of trouble occurred late on the morning of January 21. Troops 
arrived in Cincinnati the previous night, and Colonel Parsons began loading the trains to 
head east, hoping to transport five to six thousand soldiers by the end of the next day.68 
However, he began receiving miscellaneous reports of"difficulty on the Baltimore & 
Ohio RRoad preventing a rapid transfer," and requested that Dana contact Garrett to 
ascertain the true nature of the problem.69 Several hours later, Garrett informed Dana that 
a delay on the morning of January 19 was most likely the source of the reports that 
General Schofield and Colonel Parsons received, but this problem no longer existed. 70 
With the warming weather on the afternoon of January 20, the possibility of transporting 
more troops up the river to additional rail depots reemerged. If true, this would ease the 
66 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 20, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 132; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
67 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad, January 21 , 1865; Vol. 185, p. 148; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 
- July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll88); Records of the Office ofthe 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
68 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 21 , 1865; Vol. 244, p. 139; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
69 Lewis B. Parsons, Chief of Railroad Transportation, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January21 , 1865;Vol.244, p.l 39; Telegrams Receivedby the SecretaryofWar, Apri/ 15, 1861-
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
70 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 21, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 146; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, Apri/15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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congestion associated with moving twenty thousand soldiers from one city. A similar 
approach, the previous year, had assisted in the transport oftroops west to Chattanooga.71 
Garrett recommended using the planned junction at Parkersburg or Benwood, 
West Virginia. An alternate plan had the army using the Marietta and Cincinnati 
Railroad, which operated closely with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, "from Cincinnati 
for a portion so that they can be forwarded via Parkersburg."72 To handle the influx of 
traffic for this new course, Garrett made the necessary preparations in Benwood and 
Parkersburg. Additionally, he stated that he had "pressed equipment west over our whole 
line and under the organization effected we trust to accomplish satisfactory results with 
the entire movement."73 However, an unforeseen massive winter storm altered these 
plans and raised the possibility of severe negative repercussions for the transported 
soldiers. 
The storm was a combination of rain, sleet, and snow that not only delayed the 
Union troops, but also affected the telegraph wires from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad' s 
western depots to Wheeling. 74 Garrett assured Dana that the trains hauling the troops 
were progressing eastward and that his railroad had suspended all routine business along 
7 1 Clark, Railroads in the Ovil War, 163. 
72 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 21 , 1865; Vol. 244, p. 146; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, Apri/15, 1861-
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
73 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 21 , 1865; Vol. 244, p. 146; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
74 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 23, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 155; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861 -
March 31, /869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M4 73, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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the route not associated with the transfer.75 Finally, Garrett guaranteed, "Every possible 
precaution has been taken in view ofthe difficulties of the weather and the season to 
insure safety and success."76 At this point, twenty thousand soldiers from Cincinnati to 
Bellaire, Ohio, were aboard dozens of trains and steamboats, moving only when weather 
permitted, with intermittent communication due to malfunctioning telegraph wires. 
During all this, Dana' s primary request was to receive updates on the troops after they 
left Wheeling heading south towards Washington City.77 His main concern was the 
safety and successful movement of Schofield's corps. 
Meanwhile, Dana received a disturbing report from the editor of the Cincinnati 
Commercial, Murat Halstead. He informed Dana, "The soldiers of the 23rd Corps 
detained here are suffering. They are abandoned by their drunken officers. The detail of 
facts notorious here would astonish and alarm you," and added, "The loss of the corps in 
the passage east will be greater than in the campaign against Hood."78 Within two hours, 
Dana contacted Major General Darius N. Couch, who was working with the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad. He informed Dana that Halstead had greatly exaggerated the situation. 
75 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 23, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 155; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861-
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M4 73, roll 11 7); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
76 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 23, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 156; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
77 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, January23, 1865; Vol.l85, p. J66; Te/egramsSentbythe SecretaryofWar,Apri/2 7, 1861-
Ju/y 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publ ication M473 , roll 88); Records ofthe Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Bui lding, Washington, DC. Garrett's te legram that 
includes this information provides a detailed record including the number of cars in each train and the time 
of departure for these forces. 
78 M. Halstead, editor of the Cincinnati Commercial, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, January 27, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 208 ; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 117}; Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 1 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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The soldiers in Cincinnati only constituted a couple of regiments and "Proper steps have 
been taken to gather up all and bring them east."79 
Two days earlier, Dana had also received disturbing news from Garrett. 
Unrelated to the weather, transportation schedule, or points of departure, alcohol 
consumption had disrupted the travel east. On January 17, as a precautionary measure to 
ensure the discipline of the soldiers once they disembarked from the boats, Dana had 
telegraphed Major General Philip H. Sheridan, the military commander of the Middle 
Military Division, ordering him to "cause all liquor shops along the line from Parkersburg 
and Bellair[e] to be kept closed for the present."80 Enforcing this order, however, proved 
difficult. Dana's telegram from Garrett on January 25 included a message from a 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad agent in Benwood that Train Nineteen was delayed for two 
hours because "Col. White the officer in charge is stopping at Bellaire. The men are 
nearly all drunk + threaten to shoot us and burn the cars."81 To restore order and 
discipline, Garrett requested, "a vigorous officer be placed at Bellaire to insure proper 
action of officers + men during this movement," emphasizing, "It is more important that 
the orders to prevent the men from obtaining liquor should be rigidly enforced."82 
79 D. N. Couch to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, January 28, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 
2 13; Telegrams Received by the Secretmy of War, April 15, 1861- March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
8° Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Philip H. Sheridan, Commander of the Middle 
Military Division, January 17, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 131 ; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary ofWar, April 27, 
1861 - July 30, /88/ (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll88); Records ofthe Office of 
the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
81 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 25, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 192; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 117); Records ofthe Office ofthe 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
82 John W. Garrett, President Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, January 25, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 192 ; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 3/, /869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 117); Records ofthe Office ofthe 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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Considering the massive quantity of communications surrounding this event, it is likely 
that General Sheridan promptly restored order and discipline to these units. 
Other events, such as broken rails, also caused delays, but in the end, Schofield's 
corps successfully arrived in Alexandria, Virginia for their move south, compliments of 
the United States Navy. Their ultimate goal was to capture Wilmington, North Carolina 
to provide a port for General Sherman to supply his divisions.83 Meanwhile, Confederate 
General Joseph E. Johnston had surprised Sherman's forces at the Battle of Bentonville, 
North Carolina, but fled before General Sherman could amass his troops for a general 
assault.84 Before pursuing his bloodied foe, he linked up with General Schofield's newly 
arrived troops at Goldsboro establishing his supply line to Wilmington. Here General 
Sherman' s army recuperated and received supplies, for the first time since it left 
Savannah, Georgia, in preparation for its final assaults against the Confederate army. 85 
The increase in his forces by twenty thousand soldiers as well as the establishment of a 
nearby secure supply hub would not have been possible without Dana's management of 
this troop transfer. Despite the frustrations, it was an important element of General 
Sherman's march through the Carolinas.86 
Besides the immediate ramifications for the Union advance on Richmond, this 
move reveals the strengths of the Union transportation system. Unlike the Confederacy, 
the North had the benefit of being able to use water transportation to augment its 
railways, which placed less strain on the railroads and reduced the number of train 
83 Chuck Viet, "Navy Acting Like Army," Naval History 2 1, no. I (February 2007): 46-51. 
84 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 512. 
85 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 5 12. 
86 Confederate General Johnston would surrender without again fighting a meaningful 
engagement. Therefore, this troop movement arguably was unnecessary. However, these twenty thousand 
soldiers and the supply line they opened up under General Sherman's command were arguably an 
important factor in General Johnston's decision not to engage General Sherman' s forces again. 
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transfers.87 Additionally, as the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad's tracks paralleled the Ohio 
River, Colonel Parsons had some leeway to deal with weather delays. Because the 
Confederate transportation system lacked this flexibility, it did not have the ability to 
capitalize on its geographical features and rail network the way the Union could.88 
Throughout this movement, Dana was responsible to the Secretary of War for its 
success. The details in the dispatches, the amount of information Dana had to process, 
and the orders he issued were substantial. His ability to delegate and trust his 
subordinates, such as Colonel Parsons and General Allen, was a strength that helped 
Dana manage large and important operations effectively. Additionally, his understanding 
of the significance of the flurry of events and changing circumstances while calmly 
managing the situation was an important component of his administrative capabilities. 
Furthermore, this example also reveals that his responsibilities included dealing 
with potential problems, or lack thereof, due to faulty reports. Shorter examinations of 
this movement exclude faulty information, but those in charge had to confront these 
issues until proven false or properly resolved.89 They also added to the already complex 
nature of these maneuvers. The intricacy of this operation was Dana's foremost concern 
from January 11 to 30 and dominated the War Department's communications during that 
period, but Dana also had to conduct routine business at the department. Matters 
requiring his attention included reports from the Union assault and capture of Fort 
Fischer, granting civilians passage to Union occupied areas in the South, tracking a 
87 Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 33-34. 
88 Even though few works examine this move in detail, its size, complexity, and flexibility reveal 
the strength of the Union 's transportation system that handled both the men and material supporting the 
Northern war effort. 
89 A cursory examination of this movement that negates the influence of faulty information is in 
Weber, The Northern Railroads, 184-86. 
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notorious blockade runner, arranging for Brigadier General Turner to travel to 
Washington City for a meeting with the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
conducting investigations of fraud, and making various payments. However, this does 
not cover the business that required no communication outside the War Department. 
Procurement 
In addition to arranging the transportation for Union troops and prisoners, another 
important aspect of Dana's contribution to the Northern war effort was procuring and 
coordinating the delivery of supplies to the Union army. The extent of these duties 
included moving equipment and sustenance that civilian contractors supplied to giving 
orders to commanders in areas not easily accessible to the Quartermaster Corps. 
Overseeing this required someone with a high level of authority and jurisdiction due to 
the large amount of money involved. Its importance reveals not only the extent of his 
power within the War Department, but also the corresponding level oftrust that Stanton 
placed in Dana's abilities as Assistant Secretary of War.90 
90 The manner in which the Civil War affected the Northern economy is a point of contention 
between historians. Phillip Shaw Paludan summarizes the debate in "What Did the Winners Win?: The 
Social and Economic History of the North during the Civil War," in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to 
Understand, ed. James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr. (Columbia, The University of South 
Carolina Press, 1998): 174-200. However, much of the focus of this scholarship concerns the American 
Civil War as a social event because it faci litated the development of American industrial capitalism. For 
this thesis, consult Charles A. and Mary R. Beard 's Ri~e of American Civilization, 2 vols. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1927) and Louis H. Hacker's The Triumph of American Capitalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1940). 
Even though many historians have focused on how the North's economic activity facilitated social 
change, others dwell on the role of American business in supplying the Union army and the complex 
relationship that developed between the federal government and private enterprise. For an examination of 
this concerning the Northern transportation system, consult the transportation section included in this 
chapter. The most recent work on this issues is Mark R. Wilson's The Business of Civil War: Military 
Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865 (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), which 
includes an exten!tive historiographical essay examining works that have examined political, social, and 
economic issues of the Civil War. Claudia D. Goldin and Frank D. Lewis's "The Economic Cost of the 
American Civil War: Estimates and Implications," Journal of Economic History 35, no. 2 (July 1975): 299-
326 mathematically examines the direct and indirect costs of the war and concludes that the war did not 
benefit the North or the United States. 
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In addition to the funds needed to operate his investigative organization, Dana 
oversaw matters involving millions of dollars. After the war, he commented on the assets 
he managed, declaring, "Nearly $285,000,000 was paid out that year (from June, 1863, to 
June, 1864) by the quartermaster's office, and $221,000,000 stood in accounts at the end 
of the year awaiting examination before payment was made."91 Summarizing the broad 
range of purchases, he stated, "We bought fuel, forage, furniture, coffins, medicine, 
horses, mules, telegraph wire, sugar, coffee, flour, cloth, caps, guns, powder, and 
thousands of other things. Sometimes our supplies came by contract; again by direct 
purchase; again by manufacture. "92 
The Treasury Department procured the funds for the war. Dana's dispatches 
reveal his connections with that department as well as the faith and confidence they 
entrusted to him to receive these massive assets. For example, the Quartermaster in New 
York, Colonel S. L. Brown, the same quartermaster discussed in the previous chapter, 
purchased his September grain on credit, as the Treasury Department had not placed the 
necessary funds in his accounts. Several days into October, Colonel Brown sent Dana a 
telegram inquiring, "When may I expect the one million due me on my estimate for 
September?" as "My purchases have been made at panic prices and justice to the sellers 
Additional works that examine elements of contracting pertinent to this work include: Harold B. 
Hancock and Norman B. Wilkinson's "A Manufacturer in Wartime: Du Point, 1860-1865," Business 
History Review 40, no. 2 (Summer 1966): 2 I 3-236 and Mark R.. Wilson's "Gentlemanly Price Fixing and 
Its Limits: Collusion and Competition in the U.S. Explosives Industry during the Civil War Era," Business 
History Review 77, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 207-234 both examine issues concerning how government 
procurement during the war affected private enterpnse. As Dana was a senior official, who oversaw these 
purchases, his actions were vital components of this exchange and therefore these affects were due to the 
policies and practices he employed and constitute a missing component of these studies. 
9 1 Dana, Recollections, 161 . 
92 Dana, Recollections, 162. 
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requires that payments should be promptly made. "93 As the "panic has reduced grain to a 
very low figure" Colonel Brown also requested assurances from Dana that the Treasury 
Department would fulfill his requisitions for October purchases as well, so that he could 
procure a large amount of grain for the next month at greatly reduced prices.94 Dana 
responded, "there will be no difficulty in providing for your necessities at the 
Treasury. "95 
Dana also worked directly with civilian contractors. On November 16, Dana 
received a telegram from George Bliss, Jr. and George W. Blunt, two businessmen from 
New York. The topic focused on the shipment of twenty thousand turkeys "or 
equivalents" to the Union army for Thanks~iving, which, to their distress, General 
Stewart Van Vliet had not yet authorized.96 Bliss asked that Dana inform General Van 
Vliet and "notify us."97 The following day the astute businessman added, "It would be a 
very great convenience in our turkey business if I could know confidentially to 
approximate number of men in each ofthe Armies ofthe Potomac James and 
93 S. L. Brown, Assistant Quartermaster, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
5, 1864; Vol. 241, p. 427; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 115); Records of the Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
94 S. L. Brown, Assistant Quartermaster, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, October 
5, 1864; Vol. 241, p. 440; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, Apri/15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 115); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
95 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to S. L. Brown, Assistant Quartermaster, October 
5, 1864; Vol.l83,p.315; TelegramsSentbytheSecretaryofWar,Apri/27, 1861-July30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll87); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
96 George Bliss Jr. to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, November 16, 1864; Vol. 243, 
p. 204; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861- March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
97 George Bliss Jr. to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, November 16, 1864; Vol. 243, 
p. 204; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473 , roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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Shenandoah respectively.'.98 Although this was not a pressing concern, Dana replied that 
he had forwarded the order to General Van Vliet on November 18, but refused to disclose 
the number of men, which would have compromised secret information concerning the 
strength of three major Union armies.99 The next day George H. Baker in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania telegraphed, "Please order transportation from Philadelphia to Sheridan's 
army for boxes containing four thousand turkeys and Heaven knows what else as a 
thanksgiving dinner for the brave fellows." 100 
While these issues may appear trivial to the broader context of the war, it 
illustrates three important aspects of the War Department's activities. First, while the 
department was responsible for equipping and sustaining the Union forces, it was 
necessary to coordinate efforts with other government divisions, such as the Treasury 
Department. Second, like the agreements with various railroad companies, the War 
Department had to manage a multitude of civilian contracts, which Congress required in 
response to the rampant abuse that occurred during Secretary of War Simon Cameron's 
tenure. Requiring the supervision of senior civilian officials within the War Department, 
this was an onerous task. As Assistant Secretary of War, Dana handled this 
responsibility. In addition, Dana also fielded requests from opportunistic businessmen, 
who operated without contracts, but still hoped to profit by selling to eager Union 
98 George Bliss Jr. to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, November 17, 1864; Vol. 243, 
p. 217; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861- March 31, 1869 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, rol1116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
99 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to George Bliss Jr., November 18, 1864; Vol. 184, 
p. 299; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/27, 1861 - Ju/y 30, 1881 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication M473, rol187); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
100 George H. Baker to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, November 19, 1864; Vol. 
243 , p. 232; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 (National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, Record 
Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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soldiers. His ability to handle these issues, in a politically sensitive manner, was an 
important aspect of the department's procurement practices and consistent with his 
effective handling of fraudulent contractors in chapter two. Furthermore, this element of 
Dana's involvement was important to the interaction between the purchases the federal 
government made during the war and the effect this had on private enterprise. 
Political Issues 
Dana's talents as a manager and his importance to the structure and functioning 
of the War Department are unquestionable. His skill for handling issues involving 
federal policies proved similarly successful. These included soldier recruitment, 
abolition of slavery, and granting approval for Northerners to travel to Union occupied 
territory. While recruitment was not an issue prior to the Battle of First Bull Run, by the 
time Dana arrived in Washington City, Congress had passed the Enrollment Act of March 
3, 1864. The War Department, however, favored volunteers instead of drafting men to 
serve in the Union army, arguably the motivation behind the Enrollment Act. 101 
Subsequently, Dana received a variety of requests from prominent state politicians asking 
him to support their recruiting efforts. Samuel M. Harrington, Jr., the Secretary of State 
of Delaware, requested on behalf of the governor "an extension of leave of absence for 
twenty days be granted to John B. Tanner, clerk in your Department to aid in raising the 
gth Regt Del Vols."102 Dana approved it the following day. 103 The Union League in 
101 Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1980), x; James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 384. For Murdock, the fundamental premise for 
the North's draft during the Civil War was "a threat to spur volunteering rather than as an end in itself." 
The purpose of the quota system the federal government installed with the Enrollment Act was to make 
individual communities raise a certain number of soldiers to serve. If an area did not enlist enough soldiers 
only then would the draft occur. McPherson parrots this aspect of Murdock's monograph. 
102 Samuel M. Harrington, Jr., Secretary of State of Delaware, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant 
Secretary of War, August 20, 1864; Vol. 240, p. 71 ; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 
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Philadelphia asked if Dana would "accept a full regiment from the Union League for one 
year, to be commanded by veteran officers, whom the Governor will commission." 104 On 
November 16, 1864, Governor Yates implored Dana to "order George Bywater," a draft 
substitute, "to be assigned or transferred" from his current new unit to the one, "in which 
he has already served three years."105 Dana approved this request. 106 
As the Union army continued to win battles and occupy more Confederate 
territory, Lincoln's administration dealt with new issues. The Southern civilian 
population as well as those in the North with family and/or property in Union occupied 
areas ofthe South began seeking permission to travel to these places. Much of Dana' s 
correspondence following the March to the Sea relates to these matters. Many even 
requested to travel using military naval transportation. In late February, Benjamin N. 
Martin, the Secretary ofthe Union Commission in New York, asked Dana to provide 
transportation forM. T. Hewitt to travel roundtrip to South Carolina "to relieve and 
1861 - March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 5); Records of the Office 
of the Secretary of War. Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
103 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Samuel M. Harrington, Jr., Secretary of State 
of Delaware, August ~ 1 , 1865; Vol. 182, p. 272; Telef{rams Sent by the Secretary of War April 27, /861 -
July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 86); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
104 George H. Baker, Secretary of the Union League Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Charles A. 
Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, January 18, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 12 1; Telegrams Received by the Secret my 
of War, April 15, 1861 - March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 11 7); 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, 
Washington, DC. 
105 Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, November 
16, 1864; Vol. 243, p. 2 10; Telegrams Received by the Secretmy of War, April !5, 1861- March 31, 1869 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 116); Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
106 
" Illinois Civil War Muster and Descriptive Rolls Database," Illinois State Archives, accessed 
Apnl 17, 20 I 3, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/archives/databases/datcivil.html. 
According to records located in the Illinois State Archives, Private George Bywater mustered out of the 2"d 
IL Cavalry on August II , 1864 and then joined the 45111 IL Infantry as a substitute on August 28, 1864. 
While the recorded ages at time of muster do not correspond to his service, 22 in 186 1 and then 2 1 in I 864, 
the hair, eyeshade, complexion, and nativity (England) match. Additionally, the remarks for Private 
Bywater who joined the 45 IL Infantry specify "Trans to CO L 2 ILL Cavalry By Order of War Dept." 
Based on th is accumulation of evidence. this study asserts that Dana corresponded to the authority in the 
War Department that issued this order. 
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report the destitution of Charleston."107 The following day, Martin also asked Dana to 
provide government transportation for C. L. Chase to travel to South Carolina "to 
investigate and relieve the wants of suffering loyalists." 108 
The War Department's involvement with the Emancipation Proclamation required 
the personal attention of the Secretary of War. However, when Stanton was not in 
Washington, Dana assumed this function, just as he had during the Presidential Election 
of 1864.109 In an enthusiastic response to Missouri Governor Thomas C. Fletcher' s 
support of the Emancipation Proclamation, Dana, a long-standing antislavery advocate, 
declared, "This Department receives with joy the assurance the telegram contained 
against slavery."110 Dana then added the War Department's conviction that "The 
abolition of slavery in Missouri is an historical event of vast significance and moment. 
As in the border struggle of Kansas the slaveholders were the first to begin the war 
107 Benjamin N. Martin, Secretary Union Commission, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, February 23, 1865; Vol. 244, p. 433; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 31, 1869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
108 Benjamin N. Martin, Secretary Union Commission, to Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of 
War, February 24, 1865, Vol. 244, p. 444; Telegrams Received by the Secretary of War, April 15, 1861 -
March 3/, /869 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 117); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
The examination of unconditional Unionist populations in the South is a growing field in Civil 
War historiography. Margaret M. Storey's Loyalty and Loss: Alabama's Unionists in the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) describes how the suffering the 
Unionists experienced throughout the war and the failures of reconstruction policy shaped their social and 
political outlook. Unlike the rest of the South's civilian population that could rely on their state and local 
governments in addition to the vast majority of their neighbors, the Unionists did not have that support 
structure and therefore suffered heavily throughout the war. Even though Storey explains that the federal 
government did not do enough to appease the Unionist population during Reconstruction, this 
correspondence reveals that the federal government knew that this population was suffering and was taking 
actions to survey its extent in order to take actions to relieve their deprivation. 
109 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Thomas C. Fletcher, Governor of Missouri, 
January 15, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 105; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April 27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
11° Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Thomas C. Fletcher, Governor of Missouri, 
January 15, 1865; Vol.l85, p.l05; TelegramsSentbytheSecretaryofWar, April27, 1861 - July30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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against freedom and democracy, so the triumph of emancipation in your great central 
state is the sure precursor and pledge of the speedy and immovable establishment of 
liberty and unity for the entire nation."111 
Missouri's proclamation of gradual emancipation was a major event. It had been 
a source of aggravation between Union and Confederate sympathizers engaged in a brutal 
political and armed struggle even before the war. In addition, controversy erupted 
concerning the very manner of emancipation, as the radical faction favored immediate 
freedom, while President Lincoln and Missouri's conservative politicians favored a law 
allowing for a more gradual process. 11 2 Dana's telegram conveying the federal 
government' s support for the state' s abolition of slavery symbolized the end of the 
intense struggle over an issue that had existed before the state's admission to the 
Union. 113 Congressional approval for the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which, once ratified by the states, abolished the institution nationally, gave 
added support. Dana's endorsement of Missouri's emancipation bill was a nationally 
important event, which he made without specifying that it was an order of Secretary 
Stanton or President Lincoln. 
111 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Thomas C. Fletcher, Governor of Missouri, 
January 15, 1865; Vol. 185, p. 105; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, April27, 1861 - July 30, 1881 
(National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
112 William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence: University 
of Kansas, 20 II), 323-25. 
11 3 Throughout the war, Missouri had a tumultuous relationship with President Lincoln ' s desire to 
end slavery. Dana's message symbolized an end of the slavery component of this struggle. As the 
emancipation proclamation and other aspects of the abolition has been a topic of fascination amongst Civil 
War scholars, a comprehensive list of works that address the issue of Missouri's abolition are not provided 
here. The works analyze this specific aspect of Missouri's emancipation, besides Harris's monograph, 
include: William E. Parrish's Turbulent Partnership: Missouri and the Union, /861-1865 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1963) and Dennis K. Boman's Lincoln's Resolute Unionist: Hamilton 
Gamble, Dred Scott Dissenter and Missouri's Civil War Governor (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2006). 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that Dana was a very effective administrator in the War Department. 
His performance in Washington City was fundamental to the Union war effort. Owing to 
this, and his prominence as an editor of the New York Tribune before the war, Dana 
earned the respect of many state politicians who were victorious in 1864 due to his 
efforts. The recently elected Republican Governor ofNew York, Reuben E. Fenton, even 
offered Dana the position of Adjutant General in the new administration. 11 4 However, 
Dana decided to retain his position as Assistant Secretary of War for the remainder of the 
war, staying in Washington even after accepting the editorship of the Republican in 
Chicago in May 1865. 115 As he recalled, "I had arranged to stay in Washington until I 
could finish the routine business upon which I was then engaged, and until Mr. Stanton 
could conveniently spare me. This was not until the 1st of July." 116 
Even though this chapter does not provide all the details of Dana's duties as 
Assistant Secretary of War, it reveals the broad scope of issues he handled, their 
significance to the Union war effort, and that lower level government officials were 
important to the federal cause. While historians focus on Dana's role as a correspondent 
for the War Department at the Siege of Vicksburg and the Battles of Chickamauga and 
Chattanooga, his responsibilities as Assistant Secretary of War in Washington City are 
another important facet of his contributions to the war effort. Some of his duties, such as 
responding to Governor Fletcher's telegram involved little time or coordination. 
114 Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to Roscoe Conkling, United States Senator from 
New York, December 9, 1864; Vol. 184, p. 406; Telegrams Sent by the Secretary of War, Apri/27, 1861 -
July 30, 1881 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M473, roll 87); Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Record Group I 07; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
115 Dana, Recollections, 290. 
11 6 Dana, Recollections, 290-9 1. 
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Arranging election furloughs and overseeing the movement of General Schofield's corps, 
however, required all of Dana's faculties as a skilled manager. The fact that Dana 
supervised a multitude of issues, in addition to the Secret Service, is truly impressive and 
discloses the immense importance of Stanton's Assistant Secretary ofWar. Even though 
historians, such as William James Flavin, have denigrated Dana's contributions to the 
Union war effort, considering Dana's execution of his diverse duties, it is clear that he 
played an integral part in the War Department and helped secure the preservation of the 
United States of America. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
Edwin Stanton died on Christmas Eve, 1869. In the days that followed, a carriage 
carrying his widow, Ellen, made its way to Oak Hill Cemetery in Washington City. The 
man given the honor of escorting her was Charles Anderson Dana. While Thomas 
Eckert, the supervisor of the central telegraph office, also accompanied them, Dana was 
the only one of Stanton's Assistant Secretaries of War to have such recognition, 
symbolizing his significance in Stanton' s War Department. 1 While Dana had reported on 
Union activities and commanders at the front early in the war, he later served as a vital 
subordinate in Washington City, overseeing investigations, troop movements, furloughs, 
and many other duties explored in this study. His somber presence in Stanton's funeral 
procession signified the tremendous role Dana had played not simply in Stanton's career, 
but also in Union victory. 
Dana's government service ended in July 1865 as he returned to his career in 
journalism. Years later, he published his Recollections about his Civil War career, which 
focused on his travels with Ulysses S. Grant in 1863. The irony is that its success 
completely overshadowed the far greater contribution Dana made to Union victory in 
1864 and 1865. While he was an influential editor at the New York Tribune prior to the 
war, his strained relationship with the paper' s senior editor, Horace Greeley, eventually 
led to Dana's resignation. His ardent support for the Union war effort, however, 
prompted Stanton to hire Dana to work at the War Department, where his efforts gained 
the Secretary' s confidence and demonstrated an ability to work effectively under 
1 Thomas, Benjamin P. and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary 
of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 640. 
Stanton's abrasive personality, which was essential to Dana's future role at the War 
Department. 
112 
After Dana returned to Washington City in the summer of 1864, he remained 
there for the majority of his time at the War Department. His diverse duties reveal the 
extent of Stanton' s authority as well as the necessity of acquiring able assistants to 
oversee them. While Dana served as an official contact in the department, relaying the 
Secretary' s decisions, such as those concerning prison administrators, he also had 
considerable power in other situations that affected the Union war effort. His attempts to 
secure soldiers' furloughs in 1864 for the presidential election contributed to Lincoln's 
reelection and eventually a successful conclusion of the war. Managing troop 
movements in 1865 provided support for General William T. Sherman' s final drive 
towards Richmond, Virginia. Furthermore, his role in investigations of fraud and 
irregular procurement practices assisted the Quartermaster Corps in punishing dishonest 
civilian contractors, ensuring that the troops received adequate provisions. All of these 
activities show Dana's contributions to the economic, political , and military aspects of 
Union victory. 
As Dana's role during the Civil War went far beyond his relationship with 
General Ulysses S. Grant, so this study hopes to increase scholars' knowledge of the 
scope of Dana' s contributions. Since the advent of the "New Military History," there has 
been a great, and much needed, focus on the experiences of common soldiers and 
civilians during war. While this is a fundamental aspect ofthe Civil War, numerous 
other components of the effective operation of the War Department have gone 
unexplored. However, Secretary Stanton alone was not responsible for its success; rather 
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it took a coordinated effort among the department's effective subordinates. While second 
tier senior officials remain relatively unknown, a heightened awareness of these 
individuals and their contributions is necessary to grasp the true scope of the Union war 
effort. Throughout Dana's tenure in the War Department, he aided the Union in a variety 
of ways, many of which were unglamorous, but still essential, for the success of the 
nation and its conflict. An appreciation for the significance of these activities is crucial 
for a true understanding of the War Department's operations and Dana' s Civil War 
career. 
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